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Two decades of research suggest that a non-specific style of autobiographical 
memory retrieval–known as overgeneral memory–may be a cognitive style that increases 
depression vulnerability. Recent theorizing and empirical evidence suggest the 
mechanisms underlying overgeneral memory include rumination and avoidance. This 
study provided a preliminary investigation of the effectiveness of an expressive writing 
intervention, which has been found to reduce rumination and avoidance, in reducing 
overgeneral memory, with the ultimate goal of preventing future depressive symptoms 
among non-depressed college students.  
Two hundred and seven non-depressed college students completed the expressive 
writing intervention, in addition to a one-month and six month follow-up assessment. 
Participants were randomized one of three writing conditions: traditional expressive 
writing, specific expressive writing, or control writing. Participants in the traditional and 
specific expressive writing conditions were instructed to write about their deepest 
 vii 
thoughts and feelings about an emotional event; the specific expressive writing condition 
contained the additional instruction that participants describe the events in a vivid and 
detailed manner. Participants in the control condition were instructed to write about a 
neutral topic (i.e., time management). All groups wrote for 20 minutes on three 
consecutive days.   
Study results showed that compared to participants in the control writing 
condition, participants in the traditional and specific expressive writing conditions 
demonstrated significantly greater autobiographical memory specificity at the six-month 
follow-up, but not at the one-month follow-up. Furthermore, the observed increase in 
autobiographical memory specificity for the expressive writing conditions could not be 
attributed to change in depressive symptoms over the same time interval. Results 
revealed that the effect of the traditional expressive writing intervention on increased 
autobiographical memory specificity was partially mediated by a reduction in avoidance 
assessed at the one-month follow-up. The hypothesis that rumination would partially 
mediate the effect of the expressive writing intervention on increased autobiographical 
memory specificity was not supported. Despite preliminary evidence that an expressive 
writing intervention compared to a control wiring condition is effective in increasing 
autobiographical memory specificity over a six-month period for initially non-depressed 
college students, it remains to be seen if increased autobiographical memory specificity 
decreases vulnerability to future depressive symptoms.  
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Depression is a common disorder with serious consequences. In any given year, 
approximately 14.8 million American adults are affected by major depressive disorder 
(Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005) and by the year 2020, the World Health 
Organization expects depression to become the second leading cause of the global burden 
of disease. Lifetime prevalence rates for major depression are as high as 20% for women 
and 12% for men (Kessler, McGonagle, Swartz, & Blazer, 1993). Moreover, estimates 
suggest that at least 60% of individuals who have experienced one episode of depression 
will go on to experience another episode, with each episode further increasing the risk of 
relapse (American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, 4th edition text revision, 2000). Also, more than half of all suicides occur in 
persons suffering from depression, and individuals with depression are 30 times more 
likely to commit suicide than the general population (Barraclough, Bunch, Nelson, & 
Sainsbury, 1974).   
Given the serious and recurrent nature of depression, an important goal among 
researches from a cognitive perspective has been to identify mental processes that render 
individuals vulnerable to developing the disorder. By identifying these cognitive patterns, 
or vulnerability mechanisms, interventions can be developed that specifically target these 
variables with the hope of preventing depressive relapse. Two decades of research 
suggest that a non-specific style of autobiographical memory retrieval–known as 
overgeneral memory–may be a trait-like cognitive style that increases depression 
vulnerability.  
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Overgeneral memory refers to the tendency to recall autobiographical information 
from one's past in a general, as opposed to a specific, manner. By definition, overgeneral 
memories lack a specific reference to a particular date and time and often describe a 
general category of events. The classic paradigm used to measure overgeneral memory is 
the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986). On the AMT, 
participants are instructed to retrieve specific memories in response to cue words. It has 
been documented that on the AMT, people suffering from depression often fall short of 
accessing specific memories, and instead provide memories that are overgeneral (see 
Williams et al., 2007 for a review). Overgeneral memory is also associated with delayed 
recovery from depression (e.g.,Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993; Dalgleish, 
Spinks, & Yiend, 2001a; Peeters, Wessel, Merckelbach, & Boon-Vermeeren, 2002).  
Furthermore, it appears that an overgeneral style of retrieval does not disappear upon 
recovery from depression (Mackinger, Loschin, & Leibetseder, 2000; Mackinger, 
Pachinger, Leibetseder, & Fartacek, 2000; Williams & Dritschel, 1988) and predicts 
future depression (Gibbs & Rude, 2004; Mackinger, Loschin et al.; Mackinger, Pachinger 
et al.; van Minnen, Wessel, Verhaak, & Smeenk, 2005). 
Why would overgeneral memory contribute to depression? People often draw on 
specific past failures and successes to solve current problems, set future goals, and 
anticipate future outcomes. In this context, it is conceivable that reduced access to 
specific memories could lead to variety of negative outcomes related to depression such 
as difficulties imagining a positive future and difficulties setting realistic and achievable 
goals (e.g., Dickson & Bates, 2006; Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 1998).  
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Given evidence that overgeneral autobiographical memory may render individuals 
more vulnerable to developing depression, it is of great interest whether overgeneral 
memory can be reduced by psychological intervention, thereby preventing the onset of 
depression. However, only three studies have investigated the effects of psychological 
treatment on overgeneral memory. Further research endeavors aimed at reducing 
overgeneral memory through theoretically informed interventions are clearly needed.  
Recent theorizing and empirical evidence suggest the mechanisms underlying 
overgeneral memory include rumination and cognitive avoidance (Williams, 2006; 
Williams et al., 2007). Thus, the first aim of the current study was to evaluate the 
usefulness of an expressive writing intervention (Pennebaker, 1989; 1997), which has 
been found to reduce rumination and facilitate emotional processing (Gortner, Rude, & 
Pennebaker, 2006), in reducing overgeneral memory.   
To this end, undergraduate college students who were not currently depressed 
were recruited from the Educational Psychology subject pool. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of three writing conditions: 1) traditional expressive writing, specific 
expressive writing, or control writing. Participants in the traditional and specific 
expressive writing conditions were instructed to write about their deepest thoughts and 
feelings about an emotional event; the specific expressive writing condition contained the 
additional instruction that participants describe the events in a vivid and detailed manner.  
The specific expressive writing group was included based on the logic that explicitly 
encouraging participants to focus on the detailed aspects of their past experiences may 
increase the intervention’s effectiveness on the ability to retrieve specific 
autobiographical memories. Participants in the control condition were instructed to write 
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about a neutral topic (i.e., time management).  All groups wrote for 20 minutes on three 
consecutive days. Participants completed a computerized version of the Autobiographical 
Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986), the commonly used methodology to 
assess overgeneral memory, immediately before receiving the intervention (Time 1) and 
one month following the intervention (Time 2). It was predicted that the expressive 
writing interventions would result in reduced overgeneral memory (increased 
autobiographical memory specificity), whereas no equivalent change was expected for 
the control condition.  
The second aim of the study was to explore how the expressive writing 
intervention might influence overgeneral memory. The expressive writing intervention 
was explicitly chosen for its potential to target two of the mechanisms that are thought to 
contribute to overgeneral memory - rumination and cognitive avoidance. The benefits of 
the expressive writing intervention on reduced overgeneral memory were expected to 
operate through the intervention’s direct influence on rumination and avoidance (i.e., 
rumination and avoidance will mediate the effect of the expressive writing intervention 
on overgeneral autobiographical memory). Therefore, in addition to the AMT, 
participants also completed measures of rumination, avoidance, and depression 
symptoms immediately before receiving the intervention (Time 1) and one month 
following the intervention (Time 2).   
Ultimately, the purpose in attempting to reduce overgeneral memory is the 
potential to prevent future depressive symptomatology. Therefore, participants completed 
a measure of depressive symptoms six months following the intervention (Time 3). It was 
anticipated that the expressive writing intervention would result in reduced overgeneral 
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memory, which in turn would result in lower rates of future depressive symptoms. In 
other words, autobiographical memory specificity was predicted to mediate the benefits 
of the expressive writing intervention on follow-up depressive symptoms.   
As mentioned previously, the expressive writing intervention was also predicted 
to reduce rumination and avoidance, which are also prospectively linked to depression 
(Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001).  In line with 
current theoretical models of overgeneral memory, it was hypothesized that rumination 
and avoidance, in addition to overgeneral memory, would each partially mediate the 
effects of the expressive writing intervention on depressive symptoms assessed at the six-
month-follow-up (Time 3).   
In summary, this study provided a preliminary investigation of the effectiveness 
of Pennebaker’s expressive writing paradigm (1989, 1997) in reducing overgeneral 
memory, with the ultimate goal of preventing future depressive symptoms among 
currently non-depressed college students. Uncovering the mechanisms of action of the 
writing intervention on possible reductions in overgeneral memory will go far to validate 
current theories, or shed light on new ideas, regarding the processes that are thought to 
contribute to overgeneral memory. Furthermore, exploring the effects of rumination, 
avoidance, and overgeneral memory in predicting future depressive symptoms will 
contribute to the understanding of processes that increase and reduce depression 






Review of the Literature 
Nearly all forms of psychotherapy rely on the ability of clients to recall specific 
events from their past. These autobiographical memories, regardless of whether they took 
place during childhood or just yesterday, provide the material that is processed during 
therapy sessions. Clearly, the ability to recall specific events from the past plays an 
important role in recovering from psychological distress. An emerging body of literature 
suggests that the ability to recall specific memories may play an important role in the 
onset and maintenance of psychological distress as well and, particularly, the onset and 
maintenance of depression. 
This review begins by providing a historical and theoretical context for research 
on overgeneral memory. The review continues with a description of the common 
methodology used to assess overgeneral memory. Next, the evidence suggesting that 
overgeneral memory is trait-like cognitive marker that may increase depression 
vulnerability is discussed. After explaining the mechanisms that are thought to contribute 
to overgeneral memory–avoidance and rumination–it becomes clear why expressive 
writing may be an appropriate intervention to reduce overgeneral memory, thus 
potentially preventing the onset or recurrence of depression.   
Overgeneral Autobiographical Memory 
Autobiographical memory refers to “the aspect of memory that is concerned with 
the recollection of personally experienced past events” (Williams et al., 2007). 
Autobiographical memories provide us with stability in our sense of self by linking our 
past experiences, including our thoughts and emotions, with our present sense of who we 
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are. Some theorists even maintain that autobiographical memories are, in fact, a part of 
the self  (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  
Given the central role autobiographical memory plays in our mental functioning, 
researchers from a cognitive perspective have been interested in the functions of 
autobiographical memory in depression. Cognitive theories of depression (Beck, 1967; 
Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) contend that negatively biased information 
processing plays a critical role in perpetuating and maintaining depression. Early work 
from this tradition focused on negative biases in the recollection of autobiographical 
memories (for reviews, see Blaney, 1986; Coyne & Gotlib, 1983). For example, 
numerous studies found that depression was associated with an increased likelihood of 
recalling negative memories (e.g., Clark & Teasdale, 1982) and with speeded access to 
negative memories (e.g., Lloyd & Lishman, 1975).   
First overgeneral memory study. Emerging from this general body of literature 
was the inadvertent discovery by Williams and Broadbent (1986) that when asked to 
recall specific autobiographical memories in response to positive and negative cue words, 
hospital inpatients who had recently attempted suicide by self-poisoning, compared with 
nondepressed controls, were more likely to provide memories that were inappropriately 
general, rather than memories that referred to specific events. The observed differences in 
memory specificity between the suicidal patients and the controls could not be accounted 
for by deficits in semantic processing or by the time period from which memories were 
recalled (distant or more recent event).  Moreover, Williams and Broadbent reported that 
many of the suicidal patients acknowledged their difficulty in recalling specific 
memories.   
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The discovery that suicidal patients tend to recall autobiographical memories that 
lack specificity has been replicated with marked success (Evans, Williams, O'Loughlin, 
& Howells, 1992; Kaviani, Rahimi-Darabad, & Naghavi, 2005; Pollock & Williams, 
2001; Williams, 1996; Williams & Dritschel, 1988). Williams and Broadbent’s (1986) 
now famous study has since spawned three decades of empirical work on the 
phenomenon that has come to be known as overgeneral memory. Although early studies 
focused on overgeneral memory in suicidal patients, the majority of studies have 
examined overgeneral memory among individuals with depression.      
Definition of overgeneral memory. Overgeneral memory refers to the tendency to 
recall autobiographical information from one’s past in a general, as opposed to a specific, 
manner. Overgeneral memories lack a specific reference to a particular date or time and 
often describe a general category of events. For example, “I enjoy going to coffee shops 
every Sunday” would be considered overgeneral, whereas “I enjoyed having coffee with 
Susan last Tuesday” would be a specific memory. By definition, specific memories refer 
to a particular event that lasted one day or less (Williams, Teasdale, Segal, & Soulsby, 
2000). Before discussing the literature linking overgeneral memory and depression, it is 
important to describe The Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 
1986), the most commonly used methodology to asses overgeneral memory.   
The Autobiographical Memory Test            
Description of the AMT.  The classic paradigm used to assess overgeneral 
memory is the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986). On 
the AMT, participants are instructed to recall a specific event that took place in their past 
in response to cue words. Participants are told that a specific memory is an event that 
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occurred within the span of one day – no more. The instructions also indicate that 
participants should try their best to recall a different memory for each cue. Participants 
are typically offered corrective feedback on the first few trials to ensure adequate 
understanding of task instructions. Traditionally, the memories are verbally recalled by 
the participant and recorded by the experimenter. On the self-administered version of the 
AMT, participants write or type their responses below each cue word. The memory 
responses are later coded for specificity to obtain an estimate of overgeneral memory. 
Computerized adaptation of the AMT.  In a recent adaptation of the traditional 
AMT, Rekart, Mineka, and Zinbarg (2006) developed and examined the efficacy of a 
self-administered computerized version of this task. Within a sample of college students, 
their results replicated the central finding in the overgeneral memory literature that 
dysphoric participants provided memory responses that were less specific and more 
overgeneral than non-dysphoric participants. Particularly encouraging was the sensitivity 
of the computerized AMT to detect group differences in a non-clinical college student 
sample.   
The computerized version of the AMT has several advantages over the traditional 
administration. Specifically, the computerized administration offers greater participant 
anonymity and provides increased standardization in administration procedures. Whereas 
the traditional AMT can take up to 30 minutes to administer to each participant, the 
computerized version is self-administered, and therefore more time and cost efficient. 
Conversely, a disadvantage of the computerized administration is the inability to provide 
corrective feedback during practice trials.  
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Inconsistencies involving the use of the AMT. Several aspects of the AMT have 
varied considerably across studies. First, there has been variability regarding the type and 
number of cue words. Typically, the cue words are equally distributed among words 
chosen to evoke positive and negative emotions. Several studies have also included a 
proportionate number of neutral/non-emotional cue words (e.g., Pollack & Williams, 
2001). Although many studies have used the ten cue words (five positive and five 
negative) from the original AMT (Williams & Broadbent, 1986), researchers have also 
developed new lists of cue words (e.g., Raes et al., 2006; Williams et al., 2000). These 
new lists of cue words have varied in length. For instance, Mansell and Lam (2004) used 
only two cue words (one positive and one negative), while others studies have used as 
many as 30 cue words (Ramponi, Barnard, & Nimmo-Smith, 2004).  
Second, studies have varied in the maximum amount of time that is allotted for 
participants to respond to each cue word. For example, this latency time has ranged from 
30 seconds (e.g., Watkins & Teasdale, 2001) to two minutes (e.g., Peeters et al., 2002; 
Wessel, Meeren, & Peeters, 2001).The maximum response time may be important 
because it could influence the likelihood that participants will be able to retrieve a 
specific memory.  Nevertheless, relative to studies that have used restricted latencies, 
studies that have allowed participants an unlimited amount of time to respond have 
reported comparable effects (e.g., Harvey, Bryant, & Dang, 1998; Rekart et al., 2006).   
Finally, there has been variation in the literature regarding the way that 
overgeneral memory is operationalized. As mentioned previously, the memories that are 
recalled on AMT are eventually coded to obtain an estimate of overgeneral memory.  
Memories are coded as specific if they refer to a specific event that happened at a 
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particular place and time and did not last longer than 24 hours (Williams & Broadbent, 
1986). Roughly half of the existing studies define overgeneral memory as a lack of 
specificity and, in turn, use the number of specific memories in their analyses. In other 
words, memories that are not specific are considered overgeneral. Rather than use the 
number of specific memories as the estimate, the remaining studies have used the number 
of overgeneral memories as the estimate in their analyses. Although the distinction 
between these two methods is subtle, using the number of specific memories as the 
estimate of overgeneral memory involves the assumption that omission responses (i.e., a 
failure to provide any memory) are overgeneral memories (van Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 
2004). However, in a recent review of the overgeneral memory literature, Williams et al. 
(2007) suggested that overgeneral memory can be detected by using either a lack of 
specificity or the presence of overgenerality as the outcome variable. As a final point, in 
concordance with the literature and for ease of expression, the term overgeneral memory 
as used throughout this review and study will refer both to a lack of specificity and to the 
presence of overgeneral memory.   
In summary, there has been wide variation involving the use of the AMT. This 
variation could lead to inconsistent findings across studies and may obscure the ability to 
detect effects involving overgeneral memory (van Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 2004). On the 
other hand, the large number of studies that have documented the presence of overgeneral 
memory could be taken as evidence that the AMT is relatively robust regarding variations 
in administration. Williams and colleagues recently suggested that researchers diversify 
the methods they use to assess overgeneral memory, as new methods of assessment might 
elucidate new mechanisms that contribute to overgeneral memory (Williams et al., 2007).  
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Overgeneral Memory and Depression Vulnerability 
Correlational evidence. A number of correlational studies have examined 
overgeneral memory in the context of depression fairly extensively and have provided 
evidence that overgeneral memory may render individuals more vulnerable to developing 
depression. There is substantial evidence that overgeneral memory is elevated among 
currently depressed individuals relative to non-depressed controls. For example, Williams 
and Scott  (1988) found that inpatients diagnosed with major depressive disorder (MDD) 
provided significantly more responses on the AMT that were overgeneral compared to 
non-depressed controls, who were matched for age and level of education. Regarding 
MDD, this effect has been replicated in numerous cross-sectional studies involving 
outpatients (Barnhofer, De Jong-Meyer, & Kleinpass, 2002; Goddard, Dritschel, & 
Burton, 1996, 2001; Kuyken & Dalgleish, 1995; Moore, Watts, & Williams, 1988; 
Puffet, Jehin-Marchot, Timsit-Berthier, & Timsit, 1991; Wessel et al., 2001), cancer 
patients (Brewin, Watson, McCarthy, Hyman, & Dayson, 1998), participants with 
comorbid borderline personality disorder (Kremers, Spinhoven, & Van der Does, 2004), 
and adolescents diagnosed with a first episode of major depression (Park, Goodyer, & 
Teasdale, 2002).  Additional studies have found that overgeneral memory is also 
associated with sub-clinical levels of depression (Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 1997; 
Moffitt, Singer, Nelligan, & Carlson, 1994; Ramponi et al., 2004; Rekart et al., 2006).         
 Because relapse rates for depression are as high as 80% (Judd, 1997), the 
presence of overgeneral memory in formerly depressed individuals would lend further 
support to the notion that overgeneral memory is a trait-like marker that is associated 
with depression. Several studies have provided such evidence by comparing levels of 
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overgeneral memory between groups of participants who have never experienced 
depression and participants who have been depressed in the past but are not currently 
depressed. Results from three studies have demonstrated that relative to controls with no 
lifetime history of MDD, adolescents (Park et al., 2002) and adults (Mackinger, 
Pachinger et al., 2000; Spinhoven, Bockting, Kremers, Schene, & Williams, 2007) with 
previous MDD who were currently in remission displayed significantly more overgeneral 
memory on the AMT. Moreover, each of these studies demonstrated that the reported 
effects were not due to group differences in current depressive symptoms.   
 The fact that overgeneral memory is observable among formerly depressed 
individuals, as well as currently depressed individuals, suggests that overgeneral memory 
persists into remission and is not merely a function of depressed mood. In fact, a 
consistent finding throughout the literature is that overgeneral memory is not dependent 
on current mood.  For example, Brittlebank et al. (1993) reported that among participants 
with MDD, baseline levels of overgeneral memory predicted depressive symptoms seven 
months later, after controlling for baseline levels of depressive symptoms. Importantly, 
levels of overgeneral memory remained stable over the follow-up period and did not 
appear to change as depressive symptoms remitted. This finding has been replicated in 
several additional studies (e.g., Dalgleish, Spinks, & Yiend, 2001b; Mackinger et al., 
2004; Peeters et al., 2002), but see Brewin, Reynolds, and Tata (1999) for contradictory 
results.     
 Prospective evidence.  Several studies have attempted to show that overgeneral 
memory is prospectively related to the onset of depression. Consistent with diathesis-
stress models of depression (e.g., Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; Beck, 1967), 
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there is evidence that overgeneral memory (the diathesis) may increase the negative 
impact of stressful life events to engender depression. For example, after controlling for 
initial levels of depressive symptoms, overgeneral memory has been found to predict 
future depressive symptoms in nonclinical samples exhibiting varying levels of 
depression following failed in vitro fertilization (van Minnen et al., 2005), the birth of a 
child (Mackinger, Loschin et al., 2000), and negative life events (Gibbs & Rude, 2004).   
Overgeneral Memory and Other Clinical Groups 
  It is worth noting that overgeneral memory has been investigated in several other 
clinical groups. Overgeneral memory has not been found in individuals with generalized 
anxiety disorder (e.g., Burke & Mathews, 1992) or social phobia (Wenzel, Jackson, & 
Holt, 2002). Among individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (e.g., Wilhelm, 
McNally, & Baer, 1997) and borderline personality disorder (e.g., Arntz, Meeren, & 
Wessel, 2002; Kremers et al., 2004), overgeneral memory was only present for 
individuals with co-morbid diagnoses of MDD. In contrast, several studies have found 
evidence of overgeneral memory in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) after controlling 
for current depressive symptoms (e.g., McNally, Lasko, & Macklin, 1995; McNally, Litz, 
Prassas, Shin, & Weathers, 1994). Interestingly, these studies reveal that it is the 
symptomatology of PTSD, particularly the intrusion and avoidance of autobiographical 
memories, that contributes to overgeneral memory rather than the exposure to traumatic 
events (Moore & Zoellner, 2007). Intrusions and avoidance are common in both PTSD 
and depression (Reynolds & Brewin, 1999) suggesting that it may be the overlap in 
symptoms that accounts for the presence of overgeneral memory in both disorders.   
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How Does Overgeneral Memory Contribute to Depression?  
 Impaired problem solving. Overall, there is accumulating evidence that an 
overgeneral style of autobiographical memory retrieval possibly represents a trait-like 
cognitive style that is causally related to the development of depression. This begs the 
question: Why does overgeneral memory contribute to depression?  First, there is 
evidence that overgeneral memory impairs interpersonal problem solving ability (e.g., 
Goddard et al., 1996, 1997, 1998; Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 2001;Williams et al., 
2006). People often draw on specific past experiences to successfully navigate social 
interactions (e.g., “How did I make friends last time I moved?”). When faced with 
difficult situations, individuals who are not able to access specific memories will be at a 
disadvantage as they are only able to generate a limited number of solutions to their 
problems (Williams et al., 1996).   
Inability to imagine the future. Second, there is evidence that overgeneral memory 
impairs the ability to imagine the future (e.g., Dickson & Bates, 2006; Williams et al., 
1996). Recent fMRI evidence revealed striking overlap in the neural pathways involved 
in recalling past events and imagining future events (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007). In 
fact, the authors propose that from an evolutionary perspective, the primary function of 
the episodic memory system may be to store and retrieve specific autobiographical 
memories in order to predict and imagine the future. The ability to reference past failures 
or successes to set future goals and the ability use past experiences to anticipate future 
outcomes is clearly adaptive. In this context, reduced access to specific memories could 
lead to variety of negative outcomes related to depression such as difficulties imagining a 
positive future and difficulties setting realistic and achievable goals.  
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Models of Autobiographical Memory in Normative Functioning 
The current understanding of the overgeneral memory phenomenon is based on 
Conway’s (2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004) 
highly regarded Self-Memory System (SMS) which describes a framework for 
understanding autobiographical memory in normative functioning. According to the SMS 
model, information that is encoded from life experiences is stored in two distinct memory 
systems based on the content of the information. The first system, referred to as the 
autobiographical knowledge base, contains temporally defined conceptual 
autobiographical knowledge. The information within this system is arranged in an 
interconnected, hierarchical manner, ranging from abstract to more specific knowledge.  
For example, knowledge of particular lifetime periods (e.g., “When I was in college”) 
would be represented further up the hierarchy than knowledge of general events (e.g., 
“Studying for final exams at the end of each semester”). The second memory system, 
which is lower in the hierarchy than the autobiographical knowledge base, stores 
information that has been encoded from specific life experiences in the form of episodic 
memories. Episodic memories contain detailed records of specific sensory-perceptual-
affective experiences (Tulving, 2002; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997). Tulving also 
notes that episodic memories often contain visual images and involve an awareness of 
oneself in the past, termed autonoetic consciousness. 
Construction of Autobiographical Memories  
According to the SMS model, specific autobiographical memories are constructed 
when autobiographical knowledge (conceptual information) joins with corresponding 
episodic memories (sensory-perceptual-affective information). Supervisory control 
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processes (executive processes) oversee and guide this construction process.  
Neuroanatomical evidence has revealed that conceptual autobiographical knowledge and 
the supervisory control processes involve frontal-temporal networks (prefrontal anterior-
temporal), whereas episodic memories are stored in posterior networks (Conway, 2005; 
Conway, Pleydell-Pearce, & Whitecross, 2001). Evidence from several EEG studies has 
demonstrated that recalling a specific autobiographical memory involves the gradual 
spread of activation throughout the brain that originates in the frontal regions (control 
processes), spreads through the temporal regions (where autobiographical knowledge is 
stored), and eventually reaches the posterior regions of the brain (where episodic 
memories are stored). The experience of recalling a specific autobiographical memory 
involves “the gradual interlocking of control processes with the autobiographical memory 
knowledge base and especially sensory-perceptual episodic memories” (Conway, 2005, 
p. 622).   
In summary, autobiographical memories are not stored in the brain as complete 
records of past experiences; rather, they are constructed when conceptual level 
autobiographical knowledge from one part of the brain (e.g., Walking my dog every 
morning) joins with information regarding specific experiences (e.g., When I met my 
neighbor David) from another part of the brain. Retrieving a specific memory is thought 
to occur through an intentional and consciously directed search process known as 
generative retrieval (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 
2004). When presented with a cue on the ATM, the first step typically involves 
elaborating the cue by generating a number of semantic associations. The associations are 
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used to access information further down the specificity hierarchy. Through an iterative 
process of elaborating and searching, specific memories are eventually reached.   
Overgeneral Memory as Truncated Search  
Overgeneral memory responses are thought to occur when the generative retrieval 
process is terminated before episodic memories are accessed (Williams et al., 2007; 
Williams et al., 2006). As a result, memories for specific events are not accessed and the 
response remains at the level of conceptual autobiographical knowledge. Stated simply, 
overgeneral memories are the result of a truncated memory search.       
Mechanisms that Contribute to Overgeneral Memory: CaR-FA-X 
In an integration of the Self-Memory System model and the empirical literature 
on overgeneral memory, Williams and colleagues have recently proposed the CaR-FA-X 
model to summarize the mechanisms that lead to overgeneral memory (Williams, 2006; 
Williams et al., 2007). CaRFAX refers to the three mechanisms that are proposed to 
contribute to overgeneral memory: capture and rumination (CaR), functional avoidance 
(FA), and executive deficits (X). According to the model, these mechanisms either 
independently or in combination contribute to overgeneral memory. In addition, the 
model acknowledges that these mechanisms also have a direct influence on depression 
that is independent of their contribution to overgeneral memory. Finally, the model 
suggests that overgeneral memory is not merely an epiphenomenon of the underlying 
processes, but rather overgeneral memory is also proposed to play a causal role in 
bringing about depression. In reviewing these mechanisms, particular attention will be 
paid to the way these mechanisms contribute to overgeneral memory and depression in 
currently depressed and formerly depressed individuals.       
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Functional Avoidance and Overgeneral Memory 
 Functional avoidance hypothesis. Overgeneral memory is thought to result from a 
dysfacilitation of the retrieval process which occurs before specific episodic memories 
are accessed (Williams et al., 2007). Because episodic memories contain detailed sensory 
information such as vivid mental images and strong affect, they have the potential to 
produce a significant disturbance in mood when they are recalled. In fact, laboratory 
evidence has found that greater detail in retrieved memories is associated with higher 
levels of self-reported emotional feelings at the time of retrieval (Schaefer & Philippot, 
2005). 
According to the functional avoidance hypothesis, individuals may truncate their 
memory search to avoid the negative affect that may accompany recalling specific 
memories (Williams, 1996). This strategy can be functional to the extent that it remains 
flexible. However, for some people, avoiding specific memories by remaining at a 
general level of description appears to develop into a rigid and habitual cognitive style.  
The type of cognitive avoidance that contributes to overgeneral memory may also 
develop and operate outside conscious awareness. 
Research linking avoidance and overgeneral memory. Avoidance is most often 
associated with experiences of trauma and is a defining symptom of PTSD. However, 
there is growing evidence that avoidance is also associated with depression. Considering 
that aversive early life experiences are associated with depression (Brewin, Andrews, & 
Gotlib, 1993) and also that severe psychological stressors often precipitate depression, it 
is reasonable to assume that individuals who are depressed, or who have experienced 
depression, utilize avoidance strategies to manage negative memories. Indeed, several 
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studies have demonstrated that depressed (Brewin et al., 1999; Kuyken & Brewin, 1994; 
Reynolds & Brewin, 1998; Spenceley & Jerrom, 1997) and formerly depressed 
individuals (Spenceley & Jerrom) exhibit avoidance symptoms. 
Three studies have specifically investigated an association between avoidance and 
overgeneral memory in samples of depressed participants. Kuyken and Brewin (1995) 
found that avoidance of memories of childhood physical or sexual abuse, as measured by 
the avoidance subscale of the Impact of Event Scale (IES;  Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 
1979), was significantly associated with overgeneral memory in women with MDD.  In a 
study of depressed cancer patients, Brewin et al.(1998) found that avoidance, also 
measured by the IES, was associated with overgeneral memory after controlling for 
severity of depression. In contrast, Brewin et al. (1999) failed to find an association 
between avoidance and overgeneral memory in a sample of individuals with MDD. 
Similarly, Gibbs and Rude (2004) did not find a correlation between avoidance and 
overgeneral memory in a nonclinical sample of college students. However, the authors 
raise an important issue related to these nonsignificant findings: Overgeneral memory 
may be most pronounced when avoidance operates on a nonconscious level of processing 
suggesting that self-report measures may be an imperfect means to assess avoidance of 
specific autobiographical memories. 
Finally, there is evidence that individuals with greater overgeneral memory may 
also exhibit cognitive avoidance across other domains. In a nonclinical sample of college 
students, Hermans, Defranc, Raes, Williams, and Eelen (2005) found that overgeneral 
memory was positively correlated with social behavioral avoidance (Cognitive 
Behavioural Avoidance Scale; Ottenbreit & Dobson, 2004), experiential avoidance 
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(Acceptance and Action Questionnaire; Hayes et al., 2004), and thought suppression 
(White Bear Supression Inventory;  Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). The authors suggest that 
attempts to regulate negative affect by avoiding specific memories is also related to a 
tendency to use avoidant strategies to manage distressing thoughts, feelings, and 
interpersonal situations. In sum, the relatively few studies that have directly investigated 
the association of avoidance and overgeneral memory in depressed samples demonstrate 
some support for the hypothesis that avoidance contributes to overgeneral memory 
among individuals who are currently or formerly depressed.   
Avoidance and Depression Vulnerability 
Although avoiding specific memories may provide some short-term relief from 
negative affect, in the long run, avoidance may actually perpetuate depression 
vulnerability. For example, in a prospective study of clinically depressed participants, 
Brewin et al. (1999) found that avoiding autobiographical memories was predictive of 
depressive symptoms at 6-month follow-up after controlling for initial levels of 
depressive symptoms. 
A recent laboratory investigation provides compelling evidence that avoiding 
specific memories is related to the onset and maintenance of depression. Dalgleish and 
Yiend (2006) randomly assigned dysphoric and nondysphoric participants to one of two 
conditions. The experimental condition involved suppressing a pre-identified distressing 
autobiographical memory while under a cognitive load that involved a stream of 
consciousness writing task. The control condition was identical to the experimental 
condition except that participants were not instructed to suppress the pre-identified 
autobiographical memory. Drawing on the related thought suppression literature (e.g., 
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Wenzlaff & Bates, 2000; Wenzlaff, Rude, & West, 2002; Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Roper, 
1988), Dalgleish and Yiend predicted that for dysphoric participants, attempting to 
suppress a distressing memory would lead to relatively speeded access to other negative 
autobiographical memories on a subsequent task, compared to the condition that did not 
involve memory suppression. They predicted no significant differences between 
conditions for the nondysphoric participants. Results confirmed their predictions.  
Attempts by dysphoric individuals to avoid negative specific memories led to the 
paradoxical effect of increasing activation of more negative memories. This important 
finding illustrates how suppressing negative autobiographical memories has downstream 
consequences that could perpetuate depressive symptoms. 
Rumination and Overgeneral Memory 
Rumination hypothesis. In addition to the role of avoidance, there is accumulating 
evidence that rumination also contributes to overgeneral memory. According to the 
“rumination hypotheses”, during the initial cue elaboration phase of generative retrieval, 
individuals may become trapped in ruminative processing which interferes with the 
retrieval process (Williams, 1996). For example, the cue word “successful” may prompt 
the elaboration “I’ll never be able to find a job”, which triggers ruminative processing.  
This example also demonstrates how both positive and negative emotional cue words can 
potentially induce rumination.   
Research linking rumination and overgeneral memory. A link between rumination 
and overgeneral memory has been reported in several experimental investigations.  In a 
sample of dysphoric and depressed participants, Watkins, Teasdale, and Williams (2000) 
found that compared to a brief rumination induction, a distraction condition decreased 
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overgeneral memory. This effect remained after controlling for possible changes in mood 
state. Watkins and Teasdale (2001; 2004) extended this finding by demonstrating, in a 
sample of clinically depressed participants, that a brief experiential self-focus induction 
(e.g., “focus your attention on your experience of…”) significantly reduced overgeneral 
memory, whereas an analytical-evaluative self-focus induction (e.g., “Think about the 
way you…”) maintained overgeneral memory. It is important to point out that the 
analytical self-focused induction may not have acted to increase overgeneral memory in 
these studies because the participants were currently depressed and therefore likely to 
naturally be exhibiting high levels of rumination. Nonetheless, these findings suggest that 
it is the analytical-evaluative aspect of rumination (self-focused attention) that contributes 
to overgeneral memory, at least for currently depressed individuals. On the other hand, an 
experiential mode of self-focused attention, one that encourages curiosity rather than 
judgment, appears to have beneficial effects on overgeneral memory.   
Extending this work, Barnard, Watkins, and Ramponi (2006) induced an analogue 
of rumination in healthy, nondysphoric individuals. According to the authors, rumination 
involves continuously generating thoughts from the same self-schema. In support of this 
idea, results demonstrated that a manipulation involving repeatedly generating self-
related information about one narrow superordinate self-related theme (designed to model 
analytical rumination) increased overgeneral memory compared to a manipulation that 
involved repeatedly generating information about different superordinate self-related 
themes. Whereas both manipulations involved thinking about self-related information, 
continuously generating information on a singular theme, versus different themes, 
appears to be a critical component in the type of rumination that affects overgeneral 
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memory. The authors posit that during ruminative processing (both naturalistically and as 
modeled in their study) the higher level schema (theme) remains constant, thus attention 
is drawn towards individual thoughts which are constantly changing (this is based on the 
logic that the mind is naturally drawn to changes in the internal environment). Therefore, 
this process is self-perpetuating and the number of themes remains limited. This 
restricted number of themes limits the information that individuals can draw on when 
attempting to elaborate cue words and retrieve specific memories. 
By piecing apart the different components of rumination, Watkins and Teasdale 
(2001; 2004) and Barnard et al. (2006) have demonstrated that it is the perseverative, 
analytical style of thinking about self-related material that may be especially likely to 
contribute to overgeneral memory. Furthermore, these studies lend strong support to the 
rumination hypothesis by showing that reducing rumination leads to decreased 
overgeneral memory (Watkins & Teasdale) and that increasing rumination leads to 
increased overgeneral memory (Barnard et al.).   
How rumination processes become activated. Recent theorizing and empirical 
work has begun to explore how ruminative processes initially become activated during 
generative retrieval. The basis for understanding this mechanism lies in the intimate 
connection between the autobiographical knowledge base and higher-level self-
representations, or self-schemas, which contain information about personal attitudes, 
values, and beliefs and guide information processing (Conway, 2005). Information stored 
in the autobiographical knowledge base exemplifies and contextualizes self-schemas.  
During autobiographical memory retrieval, the emotional cue words on the AMT as well 
as the material that is generated through elaborations of the cue words may map onto the 
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content of negative self-schemas triggering ruminative processing (Dalgleish et al., 
2003).   
Two recent studies have demonstrated support for this hypothesis.  Moreover, 
these studies begin to provide some answers as to how rumination may influence 
overgeneral memory among depression-vulnerable persons. Spinhoven et al. (2007) 
found that formerly depressed participants retrieved fewer specific memories in response 
to negative and positive cue words (e.g., “helpful”) that were associated with highly 
endorsed dysfunctional attitudes (e.g., “I should be able to please everybody”).  
Moreover, this effect remained after controlling for age, education, current depressive 
symptoms, and number of previous episodes of depression. Using a slightly different 
method to test this hypothesis, Crane, Barnhofer, and Williams (2007) investigated the 
effects of AMT cues that matched participant’s self-guides (ought, ideal, and feared 
selves) on autobiographical memory specificity in never-depressed and formerly 
depressed participants. For never-depressed participants, there was no significant 
correlation between cue self-relevancy and specificity (r = - .07, p > .70). In contrast, for 
formerly-depressed participants, there was a highly significant correlation; the greater the 
number of AMT cues that were self-relevant, the fewer the number of specific memories 
(r = -.69, p < .001). Both of these effects were independent of current mood.   
Overall, there is evidence that self-relevant cue words are more likely to 
contribute to overgeneral memory, and there is evidence that rumination contributes to 
overgeneral memory. However, research has yet to provide evidence that these processes 
are directly linked – that is, that self-relevant cue words induce rumination which then 
leads to overgeneral memory. Although speculative at this point, Crane et al., (2007) 
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suggest that in formerly depressed individuals, cues may prime latent negative self-
schemas. This notion is supported by evidence that latent negative self-schemas can be 
detected when formerly depressed individuals undergo self-focus manipulations 
(Hedlund & Rude, 1995). Because information arising from latent negative self-schemas 
is likely discrepant form current goals or active models of the self, attention may be 
drawn to this information (Conway, 2005; Conway et al., 2004; Pyszczynski & 
Greenberg, 1987). In an effort to maintain a coherent present self-image, formerly 
depressed individuals may become engaged in ruminative processing in an attempt to 
reduce the discrepancy. As a result, the ability to retrieve specific memories will be 
impaired.     
Rumination and Depression Vulnerability 
In addition to the evidence that rumination may contribute to overgeneral 
memory, a sizable body of work has investigated the role of rumination in contributing to 
depression vulnerability. According to the response style theory of depression (Just & 
Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), individuals who ruminate in response to mildly 
dysphoric moods are at an increased risk of becoming depressed and remaining depressed 
for longer periods of time.   
Research has supported the notion that rumination prolongs episodes of 
depression  (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Nolen-
Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994). There is also prospective evidence that rumination 
predicts clinical depression after controlling for initial levels of depressive symptoms 
(Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001). For example, 
using a community sample of 1,132 individuals, Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) found that a 
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ruminative way of responding to distress predicted clinically diagnosed episodes of major 
depression the following year after controlling initial depression status and depressive 
symptoms. Furthermore, among individuals with no prior history of depression, 
rumination also predicted new onsets of major depression.   
A recent focus in the literature on rumination and depression has been on 
identifying the components of rumination that are particularly maladaptive. For example, 
it has become evident that the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS;  Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991), the most commonly used measure to assess rumination, is multifactorial 
(e.g., Conway, Csank, Holm, & Blake, 2000; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999; Treynor, 
Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). Treynor et al. found that the items on the RRS 
loaded on two factors that they labeled Brooding (e.g., “Think, ‘Why can’t I handle 
things better?”) and Reflection (e.g., “Go away by yourself and think about why you feel 
this way”). Although evidence suggests that both factors are associated with concurrent 
depression, thought suppression, and attempts to inhibit emotional experience (Rude, 
Maestas, & Neff, 2007; Treynor et al.), Treynor et al. found that only the Brooding factor 
was predictive of subsequent increases in depression. Rude et al. suggest that it is the 
judgmental and evaluative aspects of rumination that distinguish ruminative processing 
from other benign forms of self-focused attention.    
Executive Deficits and Overgeneral Memory 
Finally, the CaRFAX model and empirical evidence suggest that executive 
deficits contribute to overgeneral memory (Dalgleish et al., 2007). Executive processes 
oversee the autobiographical memory construction process by initiating the memory 
search process, sustaining progress towards the goal of retrieving a memory, evaluating 
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accessed information, inhibiting unrelated information, insuring that the retrieved 
information is in fact a memory, and eventually terminating the retrieval processes when 
the goals of the search have been reached. It is conceivable that deficits in executive 
functioning would impair the ability to retrieve specific memories. Indeed, executive 
deficits may account for the fact that overgeneral memory is often found in individuals 
with frontal lobe injuries  (e.g., Baddeley & Wilson, 1986). Although executive deficits 
do not appear to completely explain the overgeneral effect in depressed and formerly 
depressed participants, they likely compound retrieval problems. For example, a reduced 
working memory could affect the ability to inhibit irrelevant information that contributes 
to rumination.   
Attempts to Reduce Overgeneral Memory: Psychological Interventions 
Given the evidence suggesting that overgeneral memory may play a role in the 
onset and maintenance of depression, it is of great interest whether overgeneral memory 
can be reduced through psychological intervention. However, only three studies to date 
have investigated the effects of psychological treatment on overgeneral memory in the 
context of depression.  Williams et al. (2000) found that an intervention involving eight 
sessions of mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT; Teasdale, Segal, & Williams, 
1995), administered in a group setting, was successful in reducing overgeneral memory 
among formerly depressed participants. Serrano, Latorre, Gatz, and Montanes (2004) 
found that a four-session intervention involving practice in recalling specific 
autobiographical memories from different life periods (e.g., childhood, adolescents) was 
successful in reducing overgeneral memories among clinically depressed and dysphoric 
older adults. Despite Serrano et al.’s encouraging results, it can not be ruled out that a 
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possible change in depression symptoms due to the intervention may have accounted for 
the observed reduction in overgeneral memory.  In addition, conclusions regarding the 
success of these interventions are limited because both studies lacked an active placebo 
control group.  In the third study that attempted to modify overgeneral memory, 
Spinhoven et al. (2006) randomly assigned formerly depressed participants to an 
intervention involving eight sessions of group cognitive therapy or to a control condition 
involving treatment as usual. Contrary to the authors’ prediction, group cognitive therapy 
had no differential effect on overgeneral memory assessed at a three-month follow-up 
compared to treatment as usual.  
 Unfortunately, none of these intervention studies investigated potential 
mechanisms of action of their selected interventions which would help explain these 
differential effects. Spinhoven et al. (2006) speculate that their cognitive therapy 
intervention may have actually promoted an analytical, evaluative form of self-focus.  
Although they do not elaborate this point, it can be inferred that encouraging participants 
to identify negative and dysfunctional thoughts and to change these thoughts – which was 
the primary focus of their cognitive therapy intervention - may have inadvertently 
encouraged participants to take a critical and judgmental attitude towards their thoughts 
and feelings.  In contrast, Williams et al. (2000) hypothesize that their mindfulness-based 
cognitive therapy intervention was successful in reducing overgeneral memory because it 
encouraged participants to take a nonjudgmental stance towards their thoughts, feelings, 
and experiences. In turn, Williams et al. (2000) propose that individuals may be less 
likely to truncate the memory search in an effort to avoid negative affect associated with 
specific memories. It is unclear from their explanation if mindfulness is thought to lead to 
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the resolution of negative affect associated with specific memories, or if individuals 
simply become more tolerant of the negative affect. Either way, there is preliminary 
evidence that interventions that promote emotional acceptance and discourage self-
judgment may be especially useful in reducing overgeneral memory.   
Further research endeavors aimed at reducing overgeneral memory through 
theoretically informed interventions are clearly needed. Drawing from two decades of 
theory and research, there is reason to believe that an expressive writing intervention may 
be especially useful in reducing overgeneral memory thus preventing future onsets of 
depression. After providing an overview of the expressive writing paradigm and briefly 
reviewing the empirical findings that have been generated with this intervention, I will 
discuss the specific mechanisms through which expressive writing may affect 
overgeneral memory and depression. 
Expressive Writing 
 In a landmark study, Pennebaker and Beall (1986) empirically investigated the 
potential benefits of written emotional disclosure on mental and physical health.  The 
results of this study showed that although writing about one’s deepest thoughts and 
feelings surrounding traumatic experiences (i.e., expressive writing) was associated with 
increased distress immediately following the writing session, those who engaged in 
expressive writing demonstrated greater improvements in physical health over the months 
following the session. Inspired by these intriguing findings, an impressive body of 
empirical work has emerged over the past two decades that has explored - and found 
remarkable support for - the therapeutic benefits of expressive writing.   
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Pennebaker’s Expressive Writing Paradigm 
The basic expressive writing paradigm involves randomly assigning participants 
to either an expressive writing condition or a control writing condition. Both groups 
spend approximately 20 minutes a day for several consecutive days writing on an 
assigned topic. Participants in the experimental condition are instructed to write about 
their deepest thoughts and feeling about an emotional issue, whereas participants in the 
control condition are asked to write about superficial topics, such as time management.   
Effects of expressive writing on physical health. Using the expressive writing 
paradigm, numerous studies have provided support for the benefits of expressive writing 
on a wide variety of physiological and psychological outcomes across diverse samples 
(for reviews see Frisina, Borod, & Lepore, 2004; Pennebaker, 1997; Smyth, 1998).  
Health benefits associated with expressive writing include, but are not limited to, 
improved immune functioning in individuals with HIV (Petrie, Fontanilla, Thomas, 
Booth, & Pennebaker, 2004), fewer medical appointments for cancer-related morbidity in 
breast cancer patients (Stanton et al., 2002), and lower systolic and diastolic blood 
pressure in individuals with high blood pressure (McGuire, Greenberg, & Gevirtz, 2005).  
The expressive writing paradigm has demonstrated benefits for healthy 
individuals as well. For example, relative to people in control writing conditions, people 
who write about emotional experiences have shown a reduction in the number of illness 
related physician visits in the months following the interventions (e.g., Pennebaker, 
Colder, & Sharp, 1990; Pennebaker & Francis, 1996; Pennebaker, Kiecolt-Glaser, & 
Glaser, 1988). Beyond health related outcomes, expressive writing has also proved 
beneficial for improving college students’ grade point averages (e.g., Pennebaker et al., 
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1990), reducing absenteeism from work (Francis & Pennebaker, 1992), and helping 
professionals find new jobs quicker after being laid off from work (Spera, Buhrfeind, & 
Pennebaker; 1994).   
Effects of expressive writing on depression symptoms.  Compared to the 
abundance of studies that have investigated the physiological benefits of expressive 
writing, the number of studies that have specifically investigated the effects of expressive 
writing on depression or depressive symptoms is rather small. However, the evidence that 
does exist is encouraging. For example, Lepore (1997) found that compared to control 
participants, college students who engaged in expressive writing demonstrated a 
significant decline in depressive symptoms, as measured by the depressive subscale of 
the SCL-90-R, over the month preceding an exam. Also in a sample of college students, 
Epstein, Sloan, and Marx (2005) found that expressive writing was associated with a 
significant decline in one month follow-up depressive symptoms on the Depression and 
Anxiety Stress Scale (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). Compared to a control condition, 
Solano, Donati, Pecci, Persichetti, and Colaci (2003) found that patients who had 
engaged in expressive writing demonstrated lower depressive symptoms on the SCL-90 
following a relatively minor surgical procedure. Finally, Sloan and Marx (2004) found 
that women with PTSD symptoms who engaged in expressive writing showed a 
significant reduction in depressive symptoms on the Beck Depression Inventory – Second 
Version (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, Ball, & Ranieri, 1996) at a one-month follow-up, while no 
equivalent reduction was found for control participants. 
Gortner et al. (2006) recently extended these findings by applying the expressive 
writing paradigm to a sample of formerly depressed college students. Based on the notion 
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that written emotional disclosure is proposed to counteract inhibitory strategies such as 
thought suppression and avoidance (e.g., Pennebaker, 1989, 1997), the authors 
hypothesized that people who tend to suppresses their emotions would be especially 
likely to benefit from expressive writing. In support of their prediction, formerly 
depressed students who were also less expressive (above the mean on the Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire; Gross & John, 2003) showed significantly lower depressive 
symptoms on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & 
Erbaugh, 1961) at a six-month follow-up in the expressive writing group, but not in the 
control writing group.   
Finally, a recent meta-analysis on 146 studies (including published and 
unpublished articles, unpublished doctoral dissertations, and conference papers) that have 
investigated Pennebaker’s expressive writing paradigm in randomized experiments 
highlights the potential of an expressive writing paradigm to lower depressive symptoms 
(Frattaroli, 2006). Within this larger group of studies, an analysis of the 27 studies that 
included outcome variables related to depression revealed that depression symptoms were 
shown to improve as a result of written disclosure, with a mean unweighted effect size of 
r = .073, p < .043.  This effect size is comparable to the overall effect size of expressive 
writing on a diverse range of positive outcomes (147 studies; mean unweighted effect 
size r = .075, p = 3 x 10-9). Although the effect size for depression outcomes is 
significant, it might be considered small by some standards. However, as Frattaroli points 
out, given that the intervention is very brief, extremely cost-effective, yet still shows the 
ability to produce positive effects, this effect size is indeed meaningful. Moreover, the 
fact that across many different studies, people in the experimental writing groups are 
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significantly more likely than people in control groups to express that the writing exercise 
was helpful, and overall, a positive experience, suggests that expressive writing is an 
intervention that people may actually utilize and adhere to.  
Expressive Writing to Reduce Overgeneral Memory and Prevent Depression 
As reviewed earlier, the mechanisms that are proposed to contribute to 
overgeneral memory include rumination and avoidance. Independent of their contribution 
to overgeneral memory, evidence suggests that rumination and avoidance, in addition to 
overgeneral memory, are potentially related to the development of depression. 
Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that expressive writing may be especially 
beneficial in lowering rumination and avoidance, thereby reducing overgeneral memory 
and potentially preventing the onset or recurrence of depressive symptoms. 
Relationship between avoidance and rumination. Individuals may avoid specific 
memories because recalling specific events may bring about negative affect. Avoiding 
specific memories, however, is cognitively taxing and prone to fail, especially in the face 
of competing cognitive demands, which leads to a rebound in negative thoughts that may 
promote rumination (Dalgleish & Yiend, 2006; Wenzlaff & Luxton, 2003; see Wenzlaff 
& Wegner, 2000 for a review). And even though rumination may be motivated by 
attempts to resolve self-discrepancies and come to a greater understanding of past 
experiences (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001; 
Watkins & Baracaia, 2001), it has been argued that ruminative processing is clouded by 
negative self-judgments which exacerbates negative affect and prevents the successful 
resolution of distressing experiences (Rude et al., 2007).   
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How Will Expressive Writing Reduce Rumination and Avoidance?  
To summarize, both rumination and avoidance can be conceptualized as strategies 
to manage negative emotions associated with specific autobiographical memories – yet 
neither process is helpful. Moreover, both processes suggest that the material surrounding 
the distressing memories is not fully understood or integrated into existing self-schemas 
(Pennebaker, 1993; Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999). Likely, these memories primarily 
involve images and emotions, but lack a coherent narrative and are only weakly 
integrated with general autobiographical knowledge (Conway, 2005). By encouraging 
participants to explore their thoughts and feelings in a non-judgmental manner, 
expressive writing may counteract natural tendencies toward ruminative processing.  
Expressive writing may facilitate a more productive form of emotional processing that 
leads to new insights and to a greater understanding of past experiences and, ultimately, 
discrepant evaluations and negative emotions can be resolved and assimilated into current 
self-schemas (Pennebaker, 1997; Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999). This integration and 
resolution of distressing memories may decrease access to depressive cognitive 
structures, thus offsetting rumination and rendering avoidance no longer necessary.   
Empirical evidence.  In addition to the theoretical account discussed above, there 
is some empirical evidence that bears on the ability of expressive writing to reduce 
rumination and avoidance. In a previously described study, Gortner et al. (2006) reported 
that among formerly depressed college students who were also less emotionally 
expressive, expressive writing was significantly associated with a reduction in the 
brooding (i.e., self-critical) aspect of rumination at a six-month follow-up. Reductions in 
the brooding aspect of rumination were further found to mediate the benefits of 
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expressive writing on follow-up depressive symptoms. Klein and Boals (2001) found that 
college students assigned to write about their thoughts and feelings surrounding negative 
life experiences demonstrated greater reductions in intrusive and avoidant thoughts, 
compared to college students assigned to write about positive experiences or trivial 
topics. In addition, there is preliminary evidence that expressive writing improves 
working memory (Klein & Boals). An increased working memory capacity would aid 
attempts to inhibit irrelevant information that is accessed during memory retrieval which 
leads to rumination. Finally, Schoutrop, Lange, Hanewald, Davidovich, and Salomon 
(2002) reported that writing about recent traumatic experiences brought about significant 
reductions in avoidance behavior. Overall, there is encouraging empirical evidence that 
expressive writing may be beneficial in reducing rumination and avoidance, thus 
reducing overgeneral memory and, ultimately, preventing future depression 
symptomatology among currently non-depressed college students.     
Study Aims and Hypotheses 
Accumulating evidence suggests that an overgeneral style of autobiographical 
memory retrieval may render individuals more vulnerable to developing depression. 
Therefore, psychological interventions specifically designed to target increased 
autobiographical memory specificity may aid in preventing future depressive 
symptomatology and major depressive disorder. This study provided a preliminary 
investigation of the effectiveness of Pennebaker’s expressive writing paradigm (1989; 
1997) in reducing overgeneral memory, with the ultimate goal of preventing future 
depressive symptoms. Because the specific interest was in evaluating expressive writing 
as a preventative intervention, currently non-depressed (BDI ≤ 12) college students were 
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recruited for the study sample. In addition, utilizing a relatively homogeneous sample of 
currently non-depressed participants made it possible to investigate overgeneral memory 
without the potential confounds of depression severity.    
In keeping with Pennebaker's typical expressive writing paradigm, the current 
study included an expressive writing condition (referred to as the traditional expressive 
writing condition in this study) and a control writing condition. As in prior expressive 
writing studies, participants in the traditional expressive writing group were instructed to 
write about their very deepest thoughts and feelings about any difficult or emotionally 
disturbing events they had experienced. The control condition was instructed to write 
about a neutral topic (i.e., time management). The current study also included a third 
novel writing condition referred to as the specific expressive writing condition. Identical 
instructions asked participants in the traditional and specific expressive writing 
conditions to write about their very deepest thoughts and feelings about any difficult or 
emotionally disturbing events they had experienced; however, the specific expressive 
writing condition contained the following additional instruction: “It is most important 
that you describe the events you write about in a vivid and detailed way. For example, 
you might include a precise description of the exact images, thoughts, and emotions that 
come to mind as you write.”  
The specific expressive writing group was included based on the logic that 
explicitly encouraging participants to focus on the detailed aspects of their past 
experiences may increase the intervention’s effectiveness on the ability to retrieve 
specific autobiographical memories. In support of this notion, Serrano et al. (2004) found 
that a four-session intervention involving practice in recalling specific autobiographical 
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memories from different life periods was successful in reducing the  recall of overgeneral 
memories. On the other hand, there is also evidence that having participants focus on the 
specific aspects of their past experiences may not be effective in reducing overgeneral 
memory. For instance, Spinhoven et al. (2006) found that having participants keep diaries 
of specific positive events had no effect on the retrieval of specific memories to positive 
or negative cue words at a three-month follow-up.  
In addition to questions regarding the general effectiveness of the specific 
expressive writing intervention, there was interest in whether the specific and traditional 
expressive writing conditions would affect overgeneral memory through the same 
mediating processes. Given that the primary writing instructions were identical across 
both the specific and traditional expressive writing conditions, it could be expected that 
both conditions would demonstrate similar mechanisms of action (i.e., reductions in 
rumination and avoidance) on possible reductions in overgeneral memory. However, 
Pennebaker and Chung (2007) have suggested that "forcing individuals to write about a 
particular topic or in a particular way may cause them to focus on the writing itself rather 
than the topic and the role of their emotions in the overall story" (p.268). This suggests 
that specific expressive writing condition may not facilitate the emotional processing that 
is necessary to reduce rumination and cognitive avoidance.  
Despite this limited and somewhat contradictory evidence regarding the potential 
effectiveness of the specific expressive writing condition in reducing overgeneral 
memory, the specific expressive writing condition was included for exploratory purposes. 
Accordingly, no specific hypotheses were proposed concerning differences between the 
traditional and specific expressive writing conditions. 
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Study Aim 1 
The first aim of the study was to evaluate the effectiveness of two expressive 
writing interventions (traditional and specific), compared to a control writing condition, 
in increasing autobiographical memory specificity. To this end, participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three writing conditions: 1) traditional expressive writing, 2) 
specific expressive writing, or 3) control writing. All groups wrote for 20 minutes on 
three consecutive days.  Participants completed a computerized version of the 
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986), the commonly 
used methodology to assess overgeneral memory, immediately before receiving the 
intervention (Time 1) and one month following the intervention (Time 2). 
Hypothesis 1: Effects of the Intervention on Autobiographical Memory Specificity 
It was hypothesized that participants in the traditional and specific expressive 
writing conditions would display increased autobiographical memory specificity (i.e., 
lower levels of overgeneral memory) one month following the intervention (Time 2), 
compared to participants in the control condition. 
Study Aim 2 
The second aim of the study was to explore how the expressive writing 
intervention might influence overgeneral memory. There is encouraging theoretical and 
empirical evidence that expressive writing may be beneficial in reducing rumination and 
cognitive avoidance - two of the mechanisms shown to contribute to overgeneral 
memory. The study explored if reductions in rumination and avoidance served as 
mechanisms of action (i.e., mediators) of the expressive writing intervention on possible 
increases in autobiographical memory specificity. Therefore, in addition to the AMT, 
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participants also completed measures of rumination, avoidance, and depression 
symptoms immediately before receiving the intervention (Time 1) and one month 
following the intervention (Time 2).   
Hypothesis 2: Factors that Mediate the Effects of the Intervention on Overgeneral 
Memory  
It was hypothesized that rumination and avoidance would mediate the effects of the 
expressive writing intervention on autobiographical memory specificity assessed at Time 
2.  Specifically, it was predicted that participants in the traditional and specific expressive 
writing conditions would demonstrate reduced rumination and avoidance, which in turn 
would be associated with increased autobiographical memory specificity.   
Study Aim 3 
Independent of their contribution to overgeneral memory, evidence suggests that 
rumination and avoidance, in addition to overgeneral memory, may contribute to the 
development of depression.  Accordingly, the final aim of the study was to evaluate if 
possible reductions in rumination, avoidance, and autobiographical memory brought 
about by the expressive writing intervention had a protective effect on the development 
of future depressive symptoms. Therefore, participants completed a measure of 
depressive symptoms six months following the intervention (Time 3). 
Hypothesis 3: Factors that Mediate the Effect of the Intervention on Follow-up 
Depressive Symptoms 
 It was predicted that rumination, avoidance, and overgeneral memory would each 
partially mediate the effects of the expressive writing intervention on depressive 
symptoms at the six-month follow-up (Time 3).  Specifically, participants in the 
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intervention group were expected to demonstrate reductions in Time 2 rumination, 
avoidance, and overgeneral memory, which in turn would be associated with reduced 

























 Study participants were students enrolled in undergraduate educational 
psychology courses at the University of Texas at Austin during the fall of 2006. 
Participants were deemed eligible for the study if they a) indicated by self-report during 
the departmental pre-screening that they were not currently experiencing an episode of 
depression, and b) scored 12 or lower on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et 
al., 1961; see Gortner et al., 2006 for a similar classification procedure). A total of 207 
participants completed all three assessment sessions and thus comprised the study 
sample. The mean age of participants was 20.9 years (SD = 1.77), and 70% of the sample 
were women. Three percent of the participants were classified as freshman, 9.2% as 
sophomores, 19.8% as juniors, and 67.6% as seniors. Study participants indicated they 
belonged to the following racial/ethnic categories: Asian (23.2%), Black (4.9%), 
Hispanic (18.4%), Native American (1%), White (52.2%), and Other (1.9%).     
  The study was conduced from 2006-2007 and was approved by the Institutional 
Review Board. Participants received course credit in exchange for completing the Time 1 
and Time 2 assessments. Participants received $10 following completion of the Time 3 
assessment.  
Sample Selection, Randomization, and Attrition 
 As summarized in Figure 1, the study sample was drawn from a pool of 396 
undergraduate students who indicated by self-report during the departmental pre-
screening that they were not currently depressed. Specifically, the initial pool of 396 
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participants marked "no" in response to the following question: Do you feel you are 
currently experiencing an episode of depression? Of these, 21 students chose not to 
participate in the study citing a variety of reasons (e.g., dropped educational psychology 
course and no longer needed to fulfill the research requirement; chose to complete an 
alternative assignment to fulfill course credit). From this initial pool, 375 participants 
consented to participate in the study and were randomized into intervention groups using 
a random number table. All 375 participants completed the initial online assessment 
session. Of these, 324 participants met study inclusion criteria by scoring 12 or lower on 
the Beck Depression Inventory. The 51 participants who scored 13 or greater on the BDI 
were allowed to complete the study and receive full course credit, but their data were not 
included in the analyses. Two participants failed to complete the writing task and were 
excluded from the study. A total of 322 participants successfully completed the Time 1 
assessment (i.e., measures and writing task). A total of 309 participants completed the 
one-month follow-up (Time 2).  Despite efforts to contact participants by phone and 
email, 102 participants were lost between Time 2 and Time 3 (six-month follow-up). The 
attrition between Time 2 and Time 3 could be attributed to the fact that participants were 
required to complete the Time 1 and Time 2 assessments to fulfill the departmental 
research participation requirement, whereas participation in the Time 3 assessment had 
no bearing on course credit. Because over half of the sample were college seniors, it is 
also possible that participants had graduated from college and moved between the Time 2 
and Time 3 assessment, which made contacting them difficult. A total of 207 participants 
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for eligibility (n = 375) 
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writing condition  
(n = 127) 
 
Excluded BDI > 12 
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Autobiographical Memory Test 
A computerized version of the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) was used 
to assess overgeneral memory (Rekart et al., 2006; Williams & Broadbent, 1986).  
Participants were instructed to type a specific event (or memory) in response to 18 cue 
words that were presented one at a time on a computer screen. Following the procedures 
of Rekart et al., participants were offered an unlimited amount of time to provide a 
response. Three equivalent lists of 18 cue words (Lists A, B, and C) were used in the 
study (Watkins et al, 2000; See Appendix A for word lists). Each list contained six 
positive (e.g., happy, relieved), six negative (e.g., guilty, hopeless), and six neutral (e.g., 
grass, gigantic) cue words. Participants were randomly assigned, within each writing 
condition, to receive List A, B, or C in a counterbalanced order across Times 1, 2, and 3.   
The instructions for the computerized version of the AMT are as follows (Rekart 
et al., 2006): 
The focus of this study is events that have happened in your life.     
 You will be shown some words on the computer screen.  For each    
 word or phrase, think of event that happened to you that the word reminds  
 you of.  The event could have happened recently (yesterday, last week) or   
 a long time ago.  It might be an important event, or a trivial event. 
Just one more thing:  The memory you recall should be a specific event.   
 So in response to the word ‘fun’ – it would not be OK to say, ‘I always   
 enjoy a good party’ because that does not mention a specific event.  But it   
 would be OK to say ‘I had fun at my 21st birthday celebration’ because   
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 that is a specific event.  It is also important to try to recall a different   
 memory or event for each cue word or phrase.   
Coding AMT Responses.  Participants’ responses were coded by three research 
assistants who were blind to treatment condition and time of assessment. Responses were 
initially classified as specific or nonspecific. Specific memories are those that occurred 
within the span of one day – no more. For example, “When I locked my keys in the car 
last week” would qualify as a specific memory. Each nonspecific memory was further 
classified as a) an extended memory (e.g., “My honeymoon in Mexico.”), b) a categorical 
memory (e.g., “Car trips with my family when I was a kid.”), c) a semantic association 
(e.g., ““This makes me think of my ex-wife.”), d) an omission, (“I can’t think of 
anything”), e) or a repeated memory.   
Raters were trained to high rates of reliability to code the AMT responses.  
Training involved extensive practice in coding sample responses. Once raters reached 
high levels of interrater agreement on sample responses, they began coding responses 
from the study. To assess interrater reliability, I independently coded a random sample of 
10% of the responses from each rater and obtained acceptable reliability (K =  .83 - .92), 
comparable with previous studies (e.g., Raes, Hermans, De Decker, Eelen, & Williams, 
2003). The number of specific memories on the AMT was used to operationalize 
overgeneral memory.  
Depression Symptoms 
  The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961), a widely used, self-
report measure of depressive symptomatology, was used to assess participants’ level of 
current depressive symptoms. The scale contains 21 items that are each rated on a scale 
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of 0-3, with scores ranging from 0 to 63.  Higher scores are indicative of greater 
emotional distress. Although the BDI is not a diagnostic instrument, it has high content 
validity in that it measures many of the symptoms considered to be indicative of 
depression. In addition to measuring specific symptoms of depression, the BDI is able to 
detect low levels of emotional distress. The BDI has demonstrated high reliability in 
nonclinical samples (Cronbach’s alpha = .81, range .73-.92), and correlates highly with 
clinical ratings of depression (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988).  
The Inventory to Diagnose Depression-Lifetime Version (IDDL-L; Zimmerman 
& Coryell, 1987) was used to diagnose a lifetime history of depression. The IDD-L is a 
22-item inventory designed to assess both the symptoms and severity of depression. The 
items closely correspond to the criteria of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Participants 
are asked to recall a week in their lives when they felt most depressed.  Each item 
consists of five statements assessing the degree to which one has experienced a specific 
symptom of depression. Total scores range from 0 to 88, with higher scores indicating 
more severe depression. In addition, participants indicate whether they felt that way for 
more or less than two weeks. Using clinical ratings as a criterion measure, the IDD-L has 
demonstrated good sensitivity (74%) and specificity (93%), with an acceptable level of 
agreement between the inventory and the clinical rating (K =.60; Zimmerman & Coryell, 
1987).  
Rumination  
The Ruminative Response Scale of the Response Style Questionnaire (RRS; 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) was used to assess levels of rumination.  The RRS is 
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a self-report measure that contains 22-items describing responses to a depressed mood 
that are focused on the self (e.g., “Think ‘Why do I react this way?’”), symptoms (e.g., 
“Think about how hard it is to concentrate”), or consequences of the mood (“Think ‘I 
won’t be able to do my job if I can’t snap out of this’”). Items are rated on a four-point 
Likert scale (1-almost never, 4-almost always); high scores indicate greater rumination. 
The RRS has demonstrated good internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = .89; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow). The RRS demonstrated good internal consistency in the present 
sample (Time 1 Cronbach’s alpha = .88). 
 Treynor et al. found that the items on the RRS loaded on two factors which they 
labeled Brooding (e.g., “Think, ‘Why can’t I handle things better?’”) and Reflection 
(e.g.,“Go away by yourself and think about why you feel this way”). Although evidence 
suggests that both factors are associated with concurrent depression, thought suppression, 
and attempts to inhibit emotional experience (Rude et al., 2007; Treynor et al., 2003), 
Treynor et al. found that only the Brooding factor was predictive of subsequent increases 
in depression. The Brooding subscale score was calculated using the five items identified 
by Treynor et al.  
Avoidance 
The White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) was 
used to assess the tendency to avoid or suppress distressing thoughts. The WBSI is a self-
report measure containing 15 items that are rated on a five-point Likert scale (1-strongly 
disagree, 5-strongly agree); higher scores indicate greater thought suppression. The 
WBSI has also been shown to have strong internal consistency and test-retest reliability 
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(Muris, Merckelbach, & Horselenberg, 1996). The WBSI demonstrated good internal 
consistency in the present sample (Time 1 Cronbach’s alpha = .87). 
Procedures 
Time 1-Initial Assessment 
 Participants were sent an email with a link to the study website, which contained a 
detailed description of the study. Participants were asked to read and electronically sign 
the consent form, which described the study, any anticipated risks associated with 
participation, and the limits of confidentiality. If participants had questions or concerns 
regarding the study, confidentiality, or consent, they were instructed to contact the 
principal investigator by telephone or email and refrain from continuing the study. All 
study data was stored on a password protected secure web server. Once consented, 
participants completed demographic information, followed by the AMT, the BDI, the 
IDD-L, the RRS, and the WBSI.   
Expressive Writing Intervention 
 Participants were randomized using a random number table into one of three 
intervention groups: 1) Traditional expressive writing, 2) specific expressive writing, or 
3) control writing. Participants in each condition engaged in three writing sessions, each 
lasting 20 minutes, on three consecutive days (c.f., Pennebaker, 1989; Pennebaker, 1997). 
For all thee conditions, the first writing session began immediately upon completion of 
the Time 1 assessment. Participants completed the writing sessions online in a location of 
their choosing. The webpage displayed the writing instructions and a timer throughout 
the writing exercise. A written and audible alert notified the participants when 20 minutes 
had passed and time was up.   
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Instructions for the Traditional writing condition were as follows: 
 
For the next 3 days, I would like for you to write about your very deepest 
thoughts and feelings about any difficult or emotionally disturbing events you 
have experienced in your life.  In your writing, I’d like you to really let go and 
explore your very deepest emotions and thoughts.  Don’t worry about grammar or 
spelling- that is not important. The only rule is that you write continuously for the 
full 20 minutes.  All of your writing will be completely confidential. 
Instructions for the Specific writing condition were as follows:  
For the next 3 days, I would like for you to write about your very deepest 
thoughts and feelings about any difficult or emotionally disturbing events you 
have experienced in your life. I’d like you to really let go and explore your very 
deepest emotions and thoughts. In your writing it is most important that you 
describe the events you write about in a vivid and detailed way.  For example, you 
might include a precise description of the exact images, thoughts, and emotions 
that come to mind as you write.  Don’t worry about grammar or spelling- that is 
not important. The only rule is that you write continuously for the full 20 minutes.  
All of your writing will be completely confidential. 
Instructions for the control condition varied over the three days.  The instructions for the 
first session were as follows: 
What I would like you to write about over the next 3 days is how you use your 
time.  Each day, I will give you different writing assignments on the way you 
spend your time.  In today’s writing, I want you to describe what you did 
yesterday from the time you got up until the time you went to bed.  In your 
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writing, I want you to be as objective as possible.  Please do not write about your 
emotions or opinions.  The idea is to provide a factual description of your day.  
For example, you might start when your alarm went off and you got out of bed.  
You could include the things you ate, where you went, which buildings or objects 
you passed by as you walked from place to place.  The most important thing in 
your writing, however, is for you to describe your days as accurately and as 
objectively as possible. The only rule is that you write continuously for the full 20 
minutes.  All of your writing will be completely confidential. 
For the following two sessions, participants in the control writing condition were asked to 
write about how they have used their time within the past 24 hours (Day 2), and how they 
plan to use their time during the next 2 weeks (Day 3). 
Time 2 - One-Month Follow-Up Assessment  
One month following the intervention, participants in all three writing conditions 
were sent an email with a link to complete the following measures: AMT, BDI, RRS, and 
WBSI.  
Time 3 - Six-Month Follow-Up Assessment 
Six months following the intervention, participants in all three writing conditions 














 The means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations of the study variables for the 
traditional expressive writing, the specific expressive writing, and the control conditions are 
presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3 respectively. For the traditional expressive writing condition, 
AMT specificity scores at Time 1 were significantly correlated with Time 1 rumination (RRS) 
and depressive symptoms (BDI), but not avoidance (WBSI; see Table 1). For the specific 
expressive writing condition, AMT specificity scores at Time 1 were significantly correlated 
with avoidance (WBSI), but not Time 1 depression (BDI) and rumination (RRS; see Table 2). 
For the control writing condition, AMT specificity scores at Time 1 were not significantly 



























Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of Study Variables for Participants in the 
Traditional Expressive Writing Condition  
 
 Traditional Expressive Writing Condition (n = 67 ) 
Study Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. BDI Time 1 __ -.27* .40** .72** .49** -.06 .35** .36** .43** -.11 
2. AMT Time 1  __ -.03 -.31* -.13 .57** -.21 -.10 -.23 .27* 
3. WBSI Time 1   __  .48** .36** -.16 .75** .43** .44** -.27* 
4. RRS Time 1    __ .42** -.19 .40** .52** .40** -.23 
5. BDI Time 2     __ -.10 .42** .80** .33** -.14 
6. AMT Time 2      __ -.07 -.23 -.24* .40** 
7. WBSI Time 2       __ .41** .50** -.31* 
8. RRS Time 2        __ .38** -.20 
9. BDI Time 3         __ -.34** 
10. AMT Time 3          __ 
M 5.07 11.64 42.36 9.25 4.37 10.54 36.87 8.27 4.39 13.46 
SD 3.46 4.21 11.43 6.38 5.06 4.15 11.57 7.69 4.92 3.25 
Note. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory, AMT = Autobiographical Memory Test - Number of Specific Memories, 
WBSI = White Bear Suppression Inventory, RRS = Ruminative Response Scale.  






Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of Study Variables for Participants in the 
Specific Expressive Writing Condition  
 
 Specific Expressive Writing Condition (n = 72 ) 
Study Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. BDI Time 1 __ -.13 .37** .67** .44** -.01 .48** .40** .40** .10 
2. AMT Time 1  __ -.30* -.04 .10 .43** -.16 .02 -.11 .31** 
3. WBSI Time 1   __ .46** .29* 
-
.32** 
.68** .38** .27* -.17 
4. RRS Time 1    __ .38** -.10 .55** .54** .37** -.02 
5. BDI Time 2     __ -.16 .60** .90** .59** -.26* 
6. AMT Time 2      __ -.16 -.17 -.08 .48** 
7. WBSI Time 2       __ .64** .44** -.20 
8. RRS Time 2        __ .53** -.28* 
9. BDI Time 3         __ -.10 
10. AMT Time 3          __ 
M 5.80 11.60 43.38 10.36 5.19 10.90 40.44 10.15 5.24 12.96 
SD 3.48 4.04 10.07 7.47 6.60 4.47 13.40 10.30 4.36 3.53 
Note. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory, AMT = Autobiographical Memory Test - Number of Specific Memories, 
WBSI = White Bear Suppression Inventory, RRS = Ruminative Response Scale.  




























Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of Study Variables for Participants in the 
Control Writing Condition  
 
 Control Writing Condition (n = 68 ) 
Study Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. BDI Time 1 . __ -.10 .12 .38** .34** .01 .16 .20 .23 .12 
2. AMT Time 1  __ -.12 .07 .12 .61** -.15 .16 .08 .23 
3. WBSI Time 1   __ .56** .24 .03 .73** .34** .31* -.01 
4. RRS Time 1    __ .48** .12 .66** .63** .40** -.12 
5. BDI Time 2     __ .10 .40** .75** .43** -.02 
6. AMT Time 2      __ -.10 .13 .14 .35** 
7. WBSI Time 2       __ .54** .41** -.19 
8. RRS Time 2        __ .37** -.08 
9. BDI Time 3         __ -.01 
10. AMT Time 3          __ 
M 6.12 11.65 42.94 10.43 5.21 12.25 40.07 9.31 5.62 10.71 
SD 2.77 4.19 9.86 7.17 5.15 4.21 9.37 7.70 5.80 3.53 
Note. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory, AMT = Autobiographical Memory Test - Number of Specific Memories, 
WBSI = White Bear Suppression Inventory, RRS = Ruminative Response Scale.  






Of the 322 participants who met study inclusion criteria and successfully 
completed the Time 1 assessment, 207 completed all three assessment sessions and thus 
comprise the study sample. To evaluate the effects of attrition, t-tests and chi-square 
analyses were conducted on demographic variables and baseline measures to examine 
possible differences among study completers (n = 207) and non-completers (n = 115). 
There was no significant difference in dropout rates across treatment conditions, χ2 (2, n = 
322) = .15, p = .93. Relative to completers, non-completers were more likely to be men, 
(completers = 30.4% vs. non-completers = 43.5%, χ2 (1, n = 322) = 5.52, p = .02). Study 
completers also had significantly higher Time 1 AMT specificity scores (M = 11.64, SD 
= 4.12) compared to non-completers (M = 9.71, SD = 4.84), t (70) = -3.78, p < .001, r = 
.20). Although the size of this effect would be considered small, the study hypotheses 
were reanalyzed (where applicable) using data from study non-completers. Including data 
from non-completers did not change the pattern of results. There were no significant 
differences between study completers and non-completers on baseline measures, 
including the BDI, WBSI, IDD-L, and the RRS (all p values > .20). Additionally, no 
significant group differences were found with regards to race/ethnicity, classification 
(e.g., freshman, sophomore, ect.), and age (all p values > .30).  
Tests of Group Differences on Demographic Characteristics and Baseline Measures 
 Separate one-way ANOVAs and chi-square analyses were conducted to explore 
possible differences on demographic variables and baseline measures among participants 
randomized to the traditional expressive writing condition (n = 67), the specific 
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expressive writing condition (n = 72), and the control writing condition (n = 68). Sample 
demographic and baseline characteristics and tests of group differences are summarized 
in Table 4.  There were no significant differences in demographic characteristics among 
participants in the three writing conditions (all p values > .40). Additionally, there were 
no significant differences among participants assigned to the three writing conditions on 
Time 1 measures (all p values > .20).  In separate analyses not reported here, the IDD-L 
was entered as a covariate when examining study hypotheses. The use of this covariate 
did not significantly influence results. 
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Table 4 





 Combined  
Traditional 




n  207  67  72  68  
Age M (SD), y 
y(SD, yyyears 
 20.86 (1.77)  20.72 (1.13)  20.93 (2.11)  29.91 (1.89) .74 
Women (%)  70.0  68.7  69.4  72.1 .90 
Race (%)         .50 
     Asian  23.2  25.4  27.8  16.2  
     Hispanic  18.4  19.4  20.8  14.7  
     White  52.2  49.3  47.2  60.3  
     Other  6.3  6.0  4.2  8.8  
Classification 
(%) 
        .96 
     Freshman  3.4  3.0  2.8  4.4  
     Sophomore  9.2  10.4  8.3  8.8  
     Junior  19.8  16.4  23.6  19.1  
     Senior  67.6  70.1  65.3  67.6  
Time 1 M (SD)          
     BDI  5.68   (3.27)  5.07   (3.46)  5.81   (3.48)  6.12   (2.78) .16 
     AMT  11.63 (4.12)  11.64 (4.21)  11.60 (4.04)  11.65 (4.19) .99 
     WBSI  42.90 (10.42)  42.36 (11.43)  43.38 (10.10)  42.94 (9.86) .85 
      RRS  10.02 (7.02)  9.30   (6.38)  10.36 (7.50)  10.43 (7.17) .55 
      IDD-L  23.43 (21.40)  24.68 (22.98)  22.08 (19.98)  23.42 (21.39) .78 
Note. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory, AMT = Autobiographical Memory Test - Number of Specific Memories, 
WBSI = White Bear Suppression Inventory, RRS = Ruminative Response Scale, IDD-L = Inventory to Diagnose 
Depression-Lifetime Version.  
a p is for intervention group comparisons with one-way ANOVAs and chi-square tests  
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AMT Preliminary Analyses 
The mean number of specific memories obtained on the Autobiographical 
Memory Test (AMT) at the Time 1 assessment collapsed across the three writing 
conditions was 11.63 (SD = 4.12; M proportion of specific memories = .70, SD = .23). 
This estimate is similar to those reported in the literature (e.g., Raes et al., 2006; Williams 
et al, 2000). The number of specific memories on the AMT was used to operationalize 
overgeneral memory in the current study. Although not reported here, the study results 
were also analyzed using the following variables to operationalize overgeneral memory: 
1) number of non-specific memories, 2) the proportion of specific memories to total 
responses (excludes omissions), and 3) the proportion of non-specific memories to total 
responses (excludes omissions). A similar pattern of results was obtained using these 
variables, which is consistent with recent guidelines suggesting overgeneral memory can 
be detected by using either a lack of specificity or the presence of overgeneral memory 
(Williams et al., 2007).  
Recall that participants were randomly assigned, within each condition, to receive 
AMT List A, List B, and List C in a counterbalanced order across Time 1, Time 2, and 
Time 3 (the lists were the same as those used in the Watkins et al., 2000 study). To verify 
the equivalency of AMT Lists A, B, and C, a one-way between groups (Time 1 List A, B, 
or C) ANOVA was conducted with Time 1 AMT specificity scores as the dependent 
variable. The difference between the mean Time 1 AMT scores across lists A (M = 
11.42), B (M = 11.38), and C (M = 12.08) was not significant suggesting the words lists 
can be considered equivalent. Further, three separate mixed between-within subjects 
ANOVAs were conducted for each writing condition to assess for possible differences in 
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order of AMT list administration on AMT scores across Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3. For 
all three writing conditions there were no significant interactions (list administration 
order x time), suggesting AMT scores did not differ according to the order in which the 
AMT lists were administered (all p’s for interaction term > .15).  
Examination of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Effects of the Intervention on Autobiographical Memory Specificity 
It was hypothesized that participants in the traditional and specific expressive 
writing conditions would display increased autobiographical memory specificity (i.e., 
lower levels of overgeneral memory) one month following the intervention (Time 2) 
compared to participants in the control condition.   
Results of Hypothesis 1.  The participants in the study were selected to be 
currently not depressed (i.e., BDI scores ≤12), which reduces the potential confound of 
current depressive symptoms on possible increases in autobiographical memory 
specificity. Nevertheless, because it is possible that the intervention may have had the 
unintended effect of reducing depressive symptoms, which in turn could have influenced 
AMT performance, BDI scores were analyzed first. A univariate analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) was conducted on Time 2 BDI scores, with Time 1 BDI scores held as a 
covariate. Results revealed that after controlling for Time 1 BDI scores, the intervention 
did not have a significant effect on Time 2 BDI scores F (2, 203) = .06, p = .94, partial 
eta squared = .001. Examinations of means revealed that all conditions showed a 
reduction in depression symptoms from Time 1 to Time 2 (see Table 5). To be 
conservative, Time 2 BDI scores were entered as a covariate when examining possible 
changes in AMT scores.    
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 To evaluate the effectiveness of the writing intervention on Time 2 
autobiographical memory specificity, a univariate analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) 
was conducted on Time 2 AMT specificity scores, with Time 2 BDI scores and Time 1 
AMT specificity scores held as covariates. Means and standard deviations are shown in 
Table 5. Preliminary checks were conducted to ensure there was no violation of the 
assumptions of normality, linearity, homogeneity of variances, homogeneity of inter-
correlations, homogeneity of regression slopes, and reliable measurement of the 
covariate.  
Results revealed that Time 2 BDI scores were not significantly related to Time 2 
AMT scores, F (2, 202) = 2.17, p = .14, partial eta squared = .01. Time 1 AMT scores 
were significantly related to Time 2 AMT scores F (2, 202) = 82.14, p < .001, partial eta 
squared = .29. Results also revealed a significant effect of the intervention on Time 2 
AMT specificity scores after controlling for the effects of Time 1 AMT and Time 2 BDI 
scores , F (2, 202) = 4.35, p = .01, partial eta squared = .04. Planned comparisons of 
adjusted means revealed that, contrary to prediction, participants in the control condition 
showed significantly greater AMT specificity at Time 2 compared to participants in the 
traditional writing condition, t (202) = -2.83, p = .01, partial eta squared = .04, and the 
specific writing condition, t (202) = -2.16, p = .03, partial eta squared = .02. There was no 
significant difference between the traditional and specific writing conditions, t (202) = 
.72, p = .47, partial eta squared = .003. This pattern of results holds if Time 2 BDI scores 
are not controlled for in the analysis.  
Exploratory Analyses for Hypothesis 1. Although the traditional and specific expressive 
writing interventions did not demonstrate improvements in AMT specificity at the one-
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month follow-up, it is of interest if the intervention had an effect on AMT specificity 
measured at the six-month follow-up (Time 3). Therefore, a univariate analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted on Time 3 AMT specificity scores, with Time 3 
BDI scores and Time 1 AMT specificity scores held as covariates. Means and standard 
deviations are shown in Table 5. Time 3 BDI scores were not significantly related to 
Time 3 AMT scores, F (2, 200) = 2.90, p = .09, partial eta squared = .01. Time 1 AMT 
scores were significantly related to Time 3 AMT scores F (2, 200) = 15.20, p < .001, 
partial eta squared = .07. Results also revealed a significant effect of the intervention on 
Time 3 AMT specificity scores after controlling for the effects of Time 1 AMT and Time 
3 BDI scores , F (2, 200) = 12.49, p = .001, partial eta squared = .11. Planned 
comparisons of adjusted means revealed that compared to the control condition, the 
traditional expressive writing condition, t (200) = 4.6, p <.001, partial eta squared = .10, 
and the specific expressive writing condition t (200) = 3.95, p <.001, partial eta squared = 
.07, showed significantly greater AMT specificity at Time 3. The difference between the 
traditional and specific writing conditions was not significant, t (202) = -.75, p = .45, 

















Means and Standard Deviations of Outcome Measures by Intervention  
Group at Times 1, 2, and 3 
 
  Intervention Group  
 Traditional 
n = 67 
 Specific 
n = 72 
 Control 
n = 68 
 M SD  M SD  M SD 
BDI 
 
        
Time 1 5.07 3.46  5.80 3.48  6.12 2.77 
Time 2 4.37 5.06  5.19 6.60  5.21 5.15 
Time 3 4.39 4.92  5.24 4.36  5.62 5.80 
AMT         
Time 1 11.64 4.21  11.60 4.04  11.65 4.19 
Time 2 10.54 4.15  10.90 4.47  12.25 4.21 
Time 3 13.46 3.25  12.96 3.53  10.71 3.53 
WBSI         
Time 1 42.36 11.43  43.38 10.07  42.94 9.86 
Time 2 36.87 11.57  40.44 13.40  40.07 9.37 
Time 3 _____  _____  _____ 
RRS         
Time 1 9.25 6.38  10.36 7.47  10.43 7.17 
Time 2 8.27 7.69  10.15 10.30  9.31 7.70 
Time 3 _____  _____  _____ 
Note. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory, AMT = Autobiographical Memory Test - 
Number of Specific Memories, WBSI = White Bear Suppression Inventory, RRS 







Hypothesis 2: Factors that Mediate the Effects of the Intervention on Overgeneral 
Memory  
It was hypothesized that rumination and avoidance, as measured by the RRS and 
the WBSI respectively, would mediate the effects of the intervention on autobiographical 
memory specificity assessed at Time 2. Specifically, it was predicted that participants in 
the traditional and specific expressive writing conditions would demonstrate reduced 
rumination and avoidance, which in turn would be associated with increased 
autobiographical memory specificity. The purpose of this hypothesis was to examine the 
mechanisms of action of the intervention. 
Results of Hypothesis 2. To meet the initial criteria of mediation, there must be an 
effect to be mediated (i.e., the predictor variable must have a significant effect on the 
outcome variable; Baron & Kenny, 1986). As revealed in the results for the first 
hypothesis, the treatment conditions (i.e., traditional and specific expressive writing) 
actually led to decreased autobiographical memory specificity one month following the 
intervention (Time 2). Because there was no initial effect to be mediated, it can be 
concluded that Hypothesis 2 was not supported. 
Exploratory Analyses for Hypothesis 2. Despite a lack of support for Hypothesis 
2, recall that exploratory analyses revealed that the expressive writing intervention did 
have a significant effect on autobiographical memory specificity measured six months 
following the intervention (Time 3). Therefore, the presence of rumination (as measured 
by the RRS) and avoidance (as measured by the WBSI) as possible mediators of the 
effect of the intervention on Time 3 autobiographical memory specificity was tested. It is 
important to note that after controlling for baseline levels of rumination and avoidance, 
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separate ANCOVAs revealed that the specific expressive writing condition did not have a 
significant effect on any of the proposed mediator variables, thus this treatment group 
was excluded from the following mediational analyses. Subsequently, the variable for the 
intervention was represented by one dummy-coded variable (traditional expressive 
writing = 1; control condition = 0).   
Overview of mediational analyses. The mediation hypotheses were tested with 
path analysis using the structural equation modeling (SEM) program AMOS 6.0. This 
procedure is fundamentally the equivalent of the classic regression method to test for 
mediation developed by Barron and Kenny (1986). Although Barron and Kenny’s 
method is more common in the published literature, a number of researchers have named 
SEM as the preferred method to test for mediation due to a number of advantages SEM 
offers (e.g., Baron & Kenny, 1986; Frazier, Tix, & Barron, 2004; Hoyle & Smith, 1994; 
Keith, 2006). For example, path analysis with SEM software allows mediation 
hypotheses to be tested in a single model, easily accommodates additional predictor 
variables, and also provides a convenient way to test the significance of the indirect (i.e., 
mediated) effect using bootstrapping procedures (Bollen & Stine, 1990; Keith, 2006; 
MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004; Shrout & Bolger, 2002).   
The mediational hypotheses were tested by comparing the fit of two nested path 
models. In the first model (see Figure 2, Model 1), paths from the intervention to the 
proposed mediator, and paths from the proposed mediator to autobiographical memory 
specificity were estimated. Also in the first model, the direct effect of the intervention on 
autobiographical memory specificity was not estimated (i.e., was fixed to zero). Model 1 
also contained paths controlling for baseline autobiographical memory specificity and the 
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baseline assessment of the proposed mediator variable. This model had 5 degrees of 
freedom. Model 1 was compared to the second path model (see Figure 2, Model 2), 
which was identical to the first model with the addition of a direct path from the 
intervention to autobiographical memory specificity (i.e., the path was freely estimated). 
Model 2 contains 4 degrees of freedom. Because the models are nested, the chi-square 
statistic for Model 1, in which the direct path from the intervention to autobiographical 
memory specificity was fixed to zero, was compared to the chi-square statistic for Model 
2, in which the corresponding path was freely estimated. If the chi-square difference test 
indicated that Model 1 does not fit the data significantly worse than Model 2 (i.e., the chi-
square test was nonsignificant), then Model 1, which does not contain a direct path from 
the intervention to autobiographical memory specificity, was accepted. Assuming that the 
accepted model provides an adequate fit to the data, full mediation is supported. 
Alternatively, if the difference in the chi-square test indicated that Model 1 does fit the 
data significantly worse than Model 2 (i.e., the difference in the chi-square test is 
significant), then the paths in the model should still be examined for the presence of a 
partial mediation.   
Further support of full or partial mediation was obtained by testing the statistical 
significance of the indirect effect (i.e., the mediated effect – the effect of the intervention 
on autobiographical memory specificity through the proposed mediator) using 
bootstrapping procedures (Preacher & Hays, 2004; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). 
Bootstrapping is a resampling method that derives empirical estimates of standard errors 
and confidence intervals (Keith, 2006; Kline, 2005).  
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The models were tested using maximum likelihood estimation. Overall model fit 
was assessed with the chi-square goodness of fit index (χ2), the Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), and the Standardized Root 
Mean Square Residual (SRMR). Current standards recommend that CFI values greater 
than .95, and RMSEA and SRMR values less than approximately .06 suggest good model 
fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Changes in chi-square values relative to changes in degrees of 






































Results of mediational analyses. The results of the mediational analyses are 
presented in Table 6. As illustrated in this table, the WBSI is the only variable that met 
the criteria for partial mediation. More specifically, for the WBSI, a chi-square difference 
test revealed that Model 2, which included a direct path from the intervention to 
autobiographical memory specificity, provided a better fit to the data than Model 1, 
which constrained the corresponding direct path to zero, ∆χ2 (1, N = 135 ) = 19.30, p = 
.00. Therefore, the direct path from the intervention to autobiographical memory 
specificity was freely estimated. The path estimates for Model 2 revealed that after 
controlling for baseline levels of autobiographical memory specificity, participants in the 
traditional expressive writing condition, compared to participants in the control writing 
condition, demonstrated a significant increase in Time 3 autobiographical memory 
specificity (Intervention → AM Specificity, B = 2.54, ß = .35, p <.001). After controlling 
for baseline scores on the WBSI, participants in the traditional expressive writing 
condition, compared to participants in the control writing condition, also demonstrated a 
significant reduction in avoidance on the WBSI (Intervention → Mediator, B = -2.78, ß = 
-.13, p = .02). In addition, after controlling for initial levels of autobiographical memory 
specificity, reductions in avoidance were significantly associated with increased 
autobiographical memory specificity at Time 3 (Mediator → AM Specificity, B = -.07, ß 
= -.20, p = .01).  Furthermore, bootstrap with 5,000 resamples to derive the 95% 
confidence interval for the indirect effect of  the intervention on Time 3 autobiographical 
memory specificity via the WBSI (i.e., the proposed mediator) revealed that the indirect 
effect was indeed significant (Intervention → AM Specificity, B =  .19, ß = .03, p = .02, 
two-tailed).   
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 Taken together, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that the effect of 
the traditional expressive writing intervention on Time 3 autobiographical memory 
specificity was partly mediated though a reduction in avoidance, as measured by the 
WBSI, which was specifically targeted by the intervention. Contrary to prediction, 
rumination, as measured by the RRS, did not mediate (or partially mediate) the effect of 
the traditional expressive writing intervention on Time 3 autobiographical memory. 
Additional analyses not reported here also tested the RRS Brooding subscale as a 





Tests of Proposed Mediators and Model Fit Statistics 
 
Note. WBSI = White Bear Suppression Inventory; RRS = Ruminative Response Scale; χ2 = chi-square; ∆χ2 = Change in chi-square statistics between Model 1 
and Model 2; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. 
 
Direct Effects Indirect Effect 
Proposed 
Mediator 
Model χ2 df ∆χ2 CFI RMSEA SRMR Intervention 










WBSI 1 24.76** 5  .86 .17 .10 -2.78* -.09**   
 2 5.46 4 19.30** .99 .05 .04 -2.78* -.07** 2.54** .19** 
RRS 1 24.92** 5  .76 .17 .11 -.28 -.08*   
 2 3.51 4 21.41** 1.0 .00 .04 -.28 -.07 2.69** .02 70
 
 72 
Hypothesis 3: Factors that Mediate the Effect of the Intervention on Follow-up 
Depressive Symptoms 
 It was predicted that rumination, avoidance, and overgeneral memory would each 
partially mediate the effects of the expressive writing intervention on depressive 
symptoms at the six-month follow-up (Time 3).  Specifically, participants in the 
intervention group were expected to demonstrate reductions in Time 2 rumination, 
avoidance, and overgeneral memory, which in turn would be associated with reduced 
depressive symptoms at Time 3.  
 Results of Hypothesis 3. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), to meet the initial 
criterion of mediation, the expressive writing intervention must have a significant effect 
on the primary outcome variable (Time 3 depressive symptoms). In other words, there 
must be an initial effect to be mediated. Unfortunately, after controlling for Time 1 
depressive symptoms, the intervention did not have a significant effect on Time 3 
depressive symptoms, F (2,201) = .33, p = .72, partial eta squared = .003, thus 
Hypothesis 3 was not supported and no further analyses were conducted to test for 











Summary and Discussion of Findings 
Is Expressive Writing Effective in Decreasing Overgeneral Memory? 
 Study results provide preliminary evidence that an expressive writing 
intervention, compared to a control writing condition, is effective in increasing 
autobiographical memory specificity over a six-month period for currently non-depressed 
college students. Specifically, results revealed that compared to the control condition, 
both the traditional expressive writing condition and the specific expressive writing 
condition showed significantly greater autobiographical memory specificity at the six-
month follow-up (Time 3). Furthermore, there was no significant change in depressive 
symptoms from baseline to Time 3 suggesting the observed increase in autobiographical 
memory specificity for the expressive writing conditions could not be attributed to 
change in depressive symptoms. The results of this study are consistent with findings 
from the two existing studies that have successfully demonstrated that overgeneral 
memory can be reduced through psychological intervention (Serrano et al., 2004; 
Williams et al., 2000). Importantly, this is the first study to include an active control 
group, increasing confidence that reductions in overgeneral memory can be attributed to 
the direct effects of the expressive writing intervention.  
Based on meta-analytic findings that expressive writing studies showed the 
greatest benefits on psychological health outcomes when follow-up assessments occurred 
within one month of the intervention (Frattaroli, 2006), it was originally hypothesized 
that increased autobiographical memory specificity would be observed among the 
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expressive writing conditions, compared to the control condition, one month following 
the intervention (Time 1). Significant differences between the expressive writing 
(traditional and specific) and control conditions, however, were not observed on the AMT 
until the six-month follow-up. A tentative explanation for this finding is that the 
intervention may have taken a relatively longer period of time to effect change in the 
mechanisms proposed to underlie autobiographical memory specificity (e.g. avoidance). 
For instance, a number of studies employing the expressive writing paradigm report that 
participants who write about emotional upheavals continue to talk with others about their 
writing topics in the months following the experiment (e.g., Pennebaker & Chung, 2007). 
It may take several months of continued social/emotional disclosure, which facilitates 
emotional processing and counteracts tendencies to avoid painful affective material, to 
influence increased autobiographical memory retrieval. It is also true that benefits of 
expressive writing on physical health outcomes have often not been manifest until several 
months following the intervention (e.g., Smyth, Stone, Hurewitz, & Kaell, 1999).  
How Does Expressive Writing Influence Overgeneral Memory? 
 Study results provide initial evidence that avoidance serves as a mechanism of 
action of the traditional expressive writing intervention on increased autobiographical 
memory specificity. More specifically, after controlling for baseline levels of 
autobiographical memory specificity and avoidance, the effect of the traditional 
expressive writing intervention, compared to the control condition, on increased 
autobiographical memory specificity at the six-month follow-up (Time 3) was partially 
mediated by a reduction in avoidance at the one-month follow-up (Time 2). It is 
important to note that the original hypothesis predicted that avoidance, assessed at the 
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one-month follow-up, would mediate the effect of the intervention on increased 
autobiographical memory specificity, also assessed at the one-month follow-up. Because 
there was no initial effect to be mediated (i.e., the intervention did not have the predicted 
effect on autobiographical memory specificity at the one-month follow-up), the original 
hypothesis was not supported. Nonetheless, the results from exploratory analyses actually 
present a stronger case that a reduction in avoidance partially explains the effect of the 
intervention on increased autobiographical memory specificity because changes in 
avoidance temporally preceded changes in autobiographical memory specificity. 
 The finding that the traditional expressive writing intervention was associated 
with a decreased tendency to avoid or suppress distressing thoughts corroborates 
proposed theoretical accounts of the underlying mechanisms that explain the 
effectiveness of expressive writing. Specifically, this result would support the notion that 
writing about one’s deepest thoughts and feelings surrounding traumatic experiences 
counteracts tendencies to avoid distressing material and facilitates cognitive and 
emotional processing (Pennebaker, 1997; Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999). This finding is 
consistent with prior studies that have demonstrated reductions in intrusive and avoidant 
thinking for negative life events (Klein & Boals, 2001) and avoidant behavior (Schoutrop 
et al., 2002) following expressive writing interventions.  
 The finding that an experimentally manipulated reduction in avoidance was 
associated with increased autobiographical memory specificity at follow-up also has 
important theoretical implications regarding processes proposed to contribute to 
overgeneral memory. Specifically, this finding builds upon prior correlational evidence 
that overgeneral memory is associated with cognitive avoidance, even among nonclinical 
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college student samples (Hermans et al., 2005). And importantly, this result furthers 
support for the prevailing functional avoidance hypothesis- the idea that the tendency to 
recall memories in an overgeneral manner may reflect a habitual cognitive avoidant style 
originally motivated by attempts to avoid negative affect associated with specific 
memories (Williams, 1996). Although the current finding cannot speak directly to the 
question of why individuals initially develop the tendency to avoid specific memories 
(presumably to guard against negative affect associated with recalling specific 
memories), study results provide the first known empirical evidence that modifying the 
tendency to engage in cognitive avoidance through psychological intervention is 
associated with increased autobiographical memory specificity. Viewed in the context of 
Conway’s (2005) Self-Memory System model of autobiographical memory, this finding 
would be consistent with the notion that individuals who are less likely to engage in 
cognitive avoidance may be less likely to prematurely truncate the memory search 
process and more likely to attempt to "search" for specific memories.   
 The hypothesis that rumination would partially mediate the effect of the 
expressive writing intervention on increased autobiographical memory specificity was 
not supported. This hypothesis was not supported primarily due to the fact that levels of 
rumination for the traditional and control conditions one month following the 
intervention were not significantly different, after controlling for baseline levels of 
rumination. Exploratory analyses also showed a similar pattern of results for the 
Brooding subscale of the RRS.  
It is curious that the writing intervention did not have a differential effect on 
rumination across the traditional and control writing conditions. However, the only 
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known study to report a reduction in rumination (as assessed by the RRS Brooding 
subscale) following Pennebaker’s expressive writing intervention, involved a sample of 
formerly depressed college students who were also less emotionally expressive (Gortner 
et al., 2006). One possible explanation is that expressive writing only shows beneficial 
effects on rumination among individuals with a greater tendency to suppress their 
emotions. In contrast to Gortner et al.’s study, the current study sample included both 
formerly and never depressed participants, which also may have reduced power to detect 
significant effects.  
  Because participants in the current sample were selected to be not depressed, and 
numerous studies have reported strong correlations between rumination and depression, 
one would expect relatively low levels of rumination in the current study sample. Based 
on principles of regression to the mean, one would expect participants in the current 
study to demonstrate an increase in rumination from Time 1 to Time 2. In this context, it 
is interesting that mean scores on the RRS for the traditional and control writing 
conditions indicate that participants in both conditions demonstrated a decrease in 
rumination from Time 1 to Time 2. A very tentative explanation could be that the control 
writing intervention provided a successful method of distraction, which reduced the 
tendency of individuals to engage in ruminative processing. A distraction effect could 
also help explain the unexpected finding that after controlling for baseline levels of 
depression and autobiographical memory specificity, participants in the control condition 
showed significantly greater autobiographical memory specificity one month following 
the intervention compared to participants in the traditional and specific writing 
conditions.  This line of thinking would be consistent with evidence that experimentally 
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induced distraction has been shown to be effective in reducing overgeneral memory 
(Watkins et al., 2000).  
“Traditional” Expressive Writing versus “Specific” Expressive Writing  
 Although no specific hypotheses were proposed regarding differential 
effectiveness or mechanisms of action for the traditional and specific expressive writing 
conditions, the discrepant pattern of results observed between the two conditions merits 
discussion. Specifically, results showed that both conditions were associated with 
increased autobiographical memory specificity at the six-month follow-up. This effect 
was partially mediated by a reduction in avoidance in the traditional expressive writing 
condition, but not in the specific expressive writing condition. Why did participants in the 
specific expressive writing intervention not show a reduction in avoidance? Recall that 
for both conditions, identical instructions asked participants to write about their very 
deepest thoughts and feelings about any difficult or emotionally disturbing events they 
had experienced; the specific expressive writing condition contained the following 
additional instruction: “It is most important that you describe the events you write about 
in a vivid and detailed way. For example, you might include a precise description of the 
exact images, thoughts, and emotions that come to mind as you write.” A tentative 
speculation may be that the additional instructions in the specific expressive writing 
condition interfered with emotional processing that is necessary to counteract tendencies 
to avoid distressing material. In fact, Pennebaker and Chung (2007) have suggested that 
"forcing individuals to write about a particular topic or in a particular way may cause 
them to focus on the writing itself rather than the topic and the role of their emotions in 
the overall story" (p.268).  
 79 
Does Reduced Overgeneral Memory Predict Follow-up Depressive Symptoms?  
It was predicted that increased autobiographical memory specificity due to the 
expressive writing intervention would partially mediate the benefits of the expressive 
writing intervention on follow-up depressive symptoms. Recall that the primary aim of 
this hypothesis was to answer important questions regarding the potential of increased 
autobiographical memory specificity to prevent the development of follow-up depression 
symptoms. Unfortunately, this hypothesis was not supported for several reasons. First, 
contrary to expectation, after controlling for baseline depressive symptoms, no significant 
difference was observed among participants in the expressive and control writing 
conditions on depressive symptoms at the six-month follow-up. It would have been 
fruitless, therefore, to examine autobiographical memory as a potential mediator of a 
nonsignificant effect. Second, regardless of whether or not the intervention had a 
significant direct effect on Time 3 depressive symptoms, the most stringent test of 
mediation requires meaningful change in the mediator (i.e., autobiographical memory 
specificity) to precede meaningful change in the outcome (i.e., depressive symptoms). 
This criterion was not met, as a significant difference between the expressive and control 
writing condition was not observed until the six-month follow-up (the final assessment of 
the study).  
Although not the primary focus of the current study, the null finding regarding the 
effect of the intervention on follow-up depression symptoms merits comment. A possible 
explanation for this nonsignificnat effect concerns the fact the study sample only included 
participants who were not currently depressed (i.e., BDI ≤ 12). Also, participants were 
not selected for the experience of prior depressive symptomatology. It can be assumed, 
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therefore, that a sizable percentage of participants had a relatively low risk of developing 
depression over the course of the study. Clearly, the nature of the study sample reduced 
the power to detect meaningful change in follow-up depressive symptoms as a result of 
the expressive writing intervention. Reduced power is further compounded by the fact 
that the overall effect size for depression outcomes in randomized expressive writing 
experiments is reportedly small to begin with (Frattaroli, 2006). Future studies could 
possibly overcome this lack of statistical power by limiting the sample to individuals with 
a heightened vulnerability to future depression based on the presence of prior depression 
or on empirically supported cognitive vulnerability factors (e.g., cognitive avoidance, 
rumination).  
Strengths of the Study 
 The current study addresses several methodological limitations of the two 
previous studies that have demonstrated the efficacy of psychological intervention in 
reducing overgeneral memory (Serrano et al., 2004; Williams et al., 2000). First, the 
current study employed a randomized controlled design, which rules out third-variable 
explanations and allows for the strongest causal inferences to be made regarding the 
effects of the expressive writing intervention on increased autobiographical memory 
specificity. Furthermore, the inclusion of an active control group increases confidence 
that differences observed between the experimental and control conditions are not due to 
experimental artifacts (e.g., demand characteristics, participant expectancies, attention).  
Additionally, the expressive writing intervention and all study measures were 
administered online, reducing experimenter bias, and participants were blinded to study 
hypotheses.  
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 The prospective design of the study, which allowed for two follow-up 
assessments, provided a significant advantage in detecting meaningful change in study 
outcomes. For instance, significant change in autobiographical memory specificity was 
not observed until the six-month follow-up for participants in the expressive writing 
conditions. Of equal importance is the fact that the inclusion of multiple follow-up points 
allowed for the most stringent test of avoidance as a mediator of the effect of the 
traditional expressive writing intervention on increased autobiographical memory 
specificity. Specifically, it was possible to show that meaningful change in avoidance as a 
result of the traditional expressive writing intervention occurred before meaningful 
change in autobiographical memory specificity.  
Study Limitations 
 Several methodological limitations of the present study should be noted. First, 
participant attrition over the course of study introduces a potential bias that limits the 
generalizability of study results. Relative to study completers, study non-completers were 
more likely to be men and had significantly lower baseline AMT specificity scores, 
although the size of this effect would be considered small. As detailed in the study 
methods, two participants did not complete the writing intervention (one from the 
traditional and one from the specific condition), 13 participants were lost to the one-
month follow-up, and an additional 102 participants were lost to the six-month follow-up. 
The most notable attrition clearly occurred during the one-month and six-month follow-
ups. As mentioned previously, this is likely attributed to the fact that participants were 
required to complete the baseline assessment, the intervention, and the one-month 
assessment to fulfill departmental course requirements. Alternatively, participation in the 
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six-month follow-up had no bearing on course credit, although participants did receive 
ten dollars for study participation. It also remains possible that greater attrition rates 
among participants with lower autobiographical memory specificity scores at baseline 
suggests that study non-completers may have found some aspect of the AMT unpleasant, 
which led them to discontinue the study.  
 The use of a sample of college students who were not currently depressed (i.e., 
BDI ≤ 12) and who were not actively seeking treatment potentially limits the 
generalizability of study results. For instance, although recruiting a sample that was not 
initially depressed provided benefits in examining overgeneral memory without the 
potential confounds of depression severity, this design feature potentially limits the 
generalizability of the findings. Given that levels of overgeneral memory are reportedly 
higher in currently and formerly depressed individuals (e.g., Williams et al, 2007), it is 
unknown if expressive writing would prove effective in increasing autobiographical 
memory specificity in theses populations. Additionally, results may not generalize to 
older or younger individuals. Lastly, depression was assessed by self-report. Thus, 
considerable caution should be used in generalizing study results to individuals with a 
clinical diagnosis of major depressive disorder.  
Conclusions and Future Directions 
In conclusion, the current study offers preliminary evidence that an expressive 
writing intervention, compared to a control writing condition, is effective in increasing 
autobiographical memory specificity over a six-month period for initially non-depressed 
college students. Compared to prior interventions that have demonstrated effectiveness in 
reducing overgeneral memory, the expressive writing intervention is very brief, 
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extremely cost-effective, yet still showed the ability to produce positive effects on 
overgeneral memory. It will be important for future research to replicate these findings 
and extend the generalizability of these results to additional populations–most 
importantly to individuals with current and past diagnoses of major depressive disorder. 
At this point in time, evidence regarding the effectiveness of expressive writing in 
reducing overgeneral memory should be viewed as preliminary, and much more research 
needs to be conducted before expressive writing is adopted as a standalone intervention.  
Uncovering avoidance as a mechanism of action of the traditional expressive 
writing on increased autobiographical memory is perhaps the most important contribution 
of the current study.  This finding provides the first known evidence that an 
experimentally manipulated reduction in cognitive avoidance–a factor theorized to 
directly influence overgeneral memory–is associated with increased autobiographical 
memory specificity at follow-up. Avoidance only partially mediated the effect of the 
intervention on autobiographical memory specificity, suggesting the necessity of further 
exploration into additional mechanisms through which expressive writing influences 
overgeneral memory.  
On the one hand, the fact that no significant change in depression symptoms was 
observed among participants in the expressive and control writing conditions over the 
study period was beneficial in that this finding strengthens the conclusion that observed 
changes in autobiographical memory specificity were not confounded by similar changes 
in depressive symptomatology. It is unfortunate, however, that the current study provides 
no data to address the important question as to whether or not increased autobiographical 
memory specificity has a protective effect on the development of future depressive 
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symptoms. Because it is possible that positive downstream effects on depression 
symptoms would have emerged over a longer follow-up period, future studies are 
encouraged to use relatively longer follow-up periods combined with multiple 
opportunities to assess study outcomes. Beyond encouraging longer follow-up periods, 
strong support that overgeneral memory increases or decreases cognitive vulnerability to 
depression would come from evidence that levels of overgeneral memory among 
individuals who were initially not depressed predicts clinically diagnosed episodes of 




















Autobiographical Memory Test Cue Words 
 
 
   
List A  List B  List C 
Grass  Pottery  Expert 
Guilty  Grief  Sad 
Happy  Devoted  Joy 
Relieved  Hopeful  Smile 
Gigantic  Ladder  Theatre 
Hopeless  Rejected  Misery 
Failure  Helpless  Ashamed 
Absence  Occasion  Rhythm 
Proud  Amazed  Faithful 
Wildlife  Moderate  Rapid 
Grave  Blame  Weakness 
Eager  Pleased  Lively 
Glorious  Calm  Cheer 
Bread  Nursery  Youngest 
Ugly  Awful  Solemn 
Worse  Mistake  Tired 
Search  Shallow  Bathe 
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